THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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MODERNISM AND ITS FUTURE

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I.

CATHOLIC AUTHORITY AND CATHOLIC PARTICULARISM

THE problem of the nature and future of the movement in religion known as modernism is one which, as time passes, must increasingly engage the attention of thoughtful people. The appeal of modernism is clearly very strong and the modernist spirit and modernist ideas are penetrating both the clerical and the lay mind with ever-increasing rapidity, even the minds of those who declare themselves to be its determined opponents. Although modernism yet displays no clear conception of what its future is to be, or of what it has positively to offer to coming generations, it is possible to see the direction in which it must move and, broadly speaking, the goal to which it must come if it remains loyal to the principles it has accepted and to which it owes the force of its appeal.

The movement is the inevitable result of that great expansion of knowledge which has made the present age so striking a contrast with the past, and has incidentally produced a far better understanding of the laws to which thought must conform if it is to be reliable. Not so long ago it was possible for one

mind to survey the whole field of established knowledge; now each of the many sciences calls for the complete devotion of a serious student of it, and even so it is difficult for him to cover the whole ground of his chosen study. The field of knowledge is expanding with amazing swiftness and every advance brings with it blessings to humanity. Religion, on the other hand, is still busy with its age-long problems and no nearer to a solution of them, and it is high time that the causes of this sterility were made clear.

Knowledge of the immensity of the universe and of the vast stretch of time during which the evolutionary process has been at work, of the universal reign of law and of the dependence of reason and activity upon the great law of the uniformity of nature, of the limitations of human consciousness, of the gradual and natural steps by which civilizations, cultures and religions have grown to their present forms, all this is modern knowledge. With this to meditate upon and to determine its outlook, the modern mind will not be content to accept without scrutiny what has been handed down from the childhood of the world, and it will apply to it the temper and the methods whose proved fruitfulness has won its confidence.

With this advance in knowledge, consciousness of the mystery of the universe and of life is not dispelled but rather intensified; increase of knowledge but emphasizes the extent of the unknown. Man everywhere has been disposed to believe that behind this perceptible universe lies a transcendent as its ground, a reality from which the phenomenal springs, and he does not cease his efforts to find evidence of the existence of that transcendent being and reliable conceptions of its nature. He has not been successful because he is unable to overcome the disabilities created by his own finitude and the nature of his consciousness. He cannot prove the existence of transcendent being because it is not presented to perception, and possibility of such presentation is his criterion of existence; he cannot frame reliable conceptions of the nature of that being in the absence of perception of it because these must be expressed in language framed upon experience of the perceptible universe and bearing with it the limitations imposed by its origin. Any conjectures he may form are composed of materials drawn from experience, and the

categories he employs are derived from the same source. How far these are applicable to transcendent being he cannot ascertain, and the more fully he realizes the superficial character of his knowledge of the visible universe, the less is he disposed to place reliance upon any definitions of the transcendent he may make. His world is the world of phenomenal existence, and he cannot confidently ascribe to transcendent reality predicates drawn from the phenomenal. All he can state regarding transcendent being and operation must be anthropomorphic and conjectural, certainly inadequate and quite possibly irrelevant. If there be a transcendent being He cannot be defined by any effort of man.

In all study of religion it is necessary to realize a vital distinction between two kinds of propositions, between those regarding concepts which are suitable material for the operations of reason and verifiable by appeal, directly or by inference, to perception and experience, and those asserted regarding concepts which cannot be thus verified and are liable to change because there is nothing to keep them firm. Imagination brings into new combinations materials drawn from experience, and thus forms concepts of both kinds. Some of these can be given actual existence, or be shown to be drawn from actual existences, others cannot; the concepts employed in discourse on strictly religious subjects are of this latter kind because the existence of objects corresponding to them cannot be demonstrated. In the absence of the check imposed by experience, no natural limit can be set to the formation of such conjectural concepts except that arising from the nature of the materials of which they are composed.

In the present age, with its experience of the transitory character of such concepts, there is a steadily increasing tendency to emphasize concepts of knowledge at the cost of concepts of conjecture. Modern thought is rising to fuller recognition of the prevalence of law, and there can be no knowledge of the laws which determine the relations of things whose actual existence cannot be established. It is this recognition of the universality of law which is the most prominent characteristic of the thought of our time. Faith, in the broader sense, is assent to an asserted judgment joined to recognition that it supplies a felt

want. In an age when the consciousness of law was weak, and superstition, which is the ascription of causal connection where none is actually perceptible, ruled the common thought, acceptance of propositions of a conjectural character was readily accorded if they were asserted with sufficient assurance. The mental habit of our time is unfavourable to such reception, and modernism in one aspect is the transference of the emphasis of religion from conjecture to knowledge; what is within the scope of reason is found to be within the domain of law.

Although no natural limit can be set to the formation of concepts regarding transcendent being and operation, limits have actually been imposed, and the various religions represent establishment of some conjectures to the exclusion of others. Traditionalism is the expression of the fact that, when once well established, religions are perpetuated as habitual ways of viewing life and relations to the transcendent, and religions are specially impatient of interference because their adherents place their hopes for the future upon them, and attacks upon religion are looked upon as a menace to life itself, thus arousing the strong instinct of self-preservation. Supporting most religions will be found an authority vested in individuals who are assumed to enjoy supernormal powers of perception of things transcendent, and who frequently claim a divine origin for the pronouncements they make.

Modernism claims and exercises the right to examine, and to modify or reject, what has come down from the past, and this is implicit rejection of the authority on which traditionalism relies. The investigations which modernism pursues are prompted by the modern spirit, and it employs as its instruments modern understanding of mental processes and the results of critical study in all departments of knowledge. Its way of approach is such that appeal to authority has no weight with it; to quote authority to modernism is rather to strengthen objection to it than to win approval; it betokens, on the part of him who thus acts, inability to understand the actual position. To the modern mind, the fact that a doctrine has long been held is an imperative call to its re-examination; if it was deemed true in an age wherein a different mentality prevailed, it cannot, without fresh appraisement, be held to be true for an age which is so com-

pletely of another habit and which commands resources of which the past knew nothing.

The authority which endorses and continues a tradition may justly be asked to give reasons for its action when it teaches doctrines which cannot be submitted to any test whereby their truth can be established. If such authority can justify its claims, modernism must submit to it and confess its error; if it cannot do so, modernism is justified in its efforts to frame a presentation of Christianity more in accordance with the demand of the modern world. The appraisement of the value of authority is to-day the vital task that Christianity is called upon to undertake, for the decline of institutional religion is most of all due to decay of deference to authority, and educated mankind is no longer to be impressed by repeated assertion when this is unsupported by real evidence. It is not sufficient for the authority to appeal to a precedent one, for this is but a transfer and not a solution of the problem; effective enough if the precedent authority is generally accepted, but ineffective if that too is required to justify itself.

There seems to be but two directions in which justification may be sought. It may be asserted that the judgments expressed in conjectural propositions are the outcome of unmediated intuition, that they are true because conveyed directly by divine inspiration to the mind of the assertor. In this case it must be asked how the proposer distinguishes such intuitions from other conjectural products of his own imagination or of that of others, and why he is so sure of their truth that he dares to make such great issues depend upon them. It is exceedingly doubtful whether there is anything in consciousness that would make such distinction possible. The alternative is to suppose that the originator of a conjectural judgment was gifted with superhuman powers of perception, and this is a position that it is difficult altogether to refute because such an originator is frequently not known, and, if he were known, it would still be necessary that another, possessing similar capacity, should certify to the originator's possession of such a gift. In any case, conjectural propositions regarding transcendent beings are assertions for the truth of which reliable evidence cannot be found. When it is remembered that, in practice, what one authority asserts another

characterizes as palpable error, and that all religions and all sectional Churches are convinced of the truth of what they hold and yet differ profoundly, authority will seem to be called upon to defend an indefensible position, and it has no weapon of defence but renewed assertion. It cannot compromise, for an authority that is not absolute becomes subject to reason.

It follows from what we have written that the rejection of authority which modernism implies must provoke a contest in which there can be no parley; the battle is joined and must be fought out. It cannot be for the ultimate good of man to place reliance on an authority which cannot establish its claims. On the other hand, if victory finally rests with modernism, a radical change in the presentation of religion must ensue, and modernism must be prepared to set forth a view of religion and of life which will be adequate to fulfil those needs of mankind which lead it to seek for knowledge of transcendent being, and such presentation must be shown to rest upon an authority of more reliable character than that on which traditionalism relies.

Apart from the difficulty authority must encounter in establishing the truth of its pronouncements regarding things beyond the domain wherein alone any criterion is applicable, two other objections have to be met. The exercise of such authority has had a harmful effect upon human life in that it has led to the substitution of the ideal of unity of belief for that of unity of moral life, and thus diverted mankind from its proper quest and brought about divisions that ought not to exist among those called to dwell together in unity. Claiming, as it does, divine endorsements for its pronouncements, not only does it create an erroneous estimate of life's values, it must also oppose a steady obstacle to the progress of the human mind. What is believed to have divine sanction will be considered to be of higher value than anything that normal human powers can accomplish, and this must create a strong prejudice against change of any kind. If authority were given a heed commensurate with its claims, all new knowledge would have to be submitted to it in order to ascertain whether it was consonant with its pronouncements or not, and authority would decide, not upon the result of a careful examination of the facts, but in view of the effects of the new knowledge upon its own prestige and previous pronouncements.

The actual demand of traditionalism is that in matters of the highest consequence the thought of the world shall be determined by the judgment of a past age, when the chief determinants of modern thought, and the chief factors in the modern problem of the transcendent, were unrealized; and authority cannot maintain its prestige if it admits that its earlier pronouncements were erroneous. It is in bonds to the past.

Another grave problem is coming upon this generation which has witnessed so marvellous a quickening up of communications between the peoples of the earth, and the consequent bringing of various cultures and traditions into contact and reciprocal influence. More than ever before is it becoming necessary to work for the unity of mankind. Education of a particular type is spreading over the world and is a powerful agency tending to produce a common mental habit. A world thus linked up needs a common ideal of truth and righteousness, and it is for those who recognize the need of a common life which shall be free from the conflict arising from the differences of culture and religion to do what they may towards bringing about better realization of human brotherhood.

Of all the obstacles to be overcome before this ideal can take effective shape, that presented by the existence of different religions is by far the greatest and the most difficult to remove. Since all religions alike are based upon conjecture regarding the transcendent, and proof of the truth of none of them can be found, there is no way of demonstrating the superiority of one over the others so far as their strictly religious conceptions are concerned. The only way to the desired unity is through transference of the emphasis from conjecture to knowledge, through appeal to that on which universal agreement is at least possible. It is doubtful whether those who have not been in close contact with religions other than their own fully appreciate this aspect of the problem of religion.

The ideal of Christianity is the universal reign of Christ, to make Him actually, which He is potentially, the Saviour of the world; when this ideal is made actual, then will the Church be truly Catholic. If this ideal is to be worked for with clear purpose and understanding, the first question to be asked and answered is that of the true nature of catholicity. A unity of

temper, aim and ideal for all humanity must be founded upon what is essentially universal in its nature, and the quality without which no gospel can be universal is that it should be such that it can be taught and understood by all in the same way; it must be simple, realizable and such that experience can verify it; failing such universality, the ideal is impossible of fulfilment. It is the plain duty of the Church, in view of the claims it makes and the ends it seeks, to examine its teaching in the light of this principle, a principle that will bring to nought all attempts to evade it, for it is but an expression of the ideal itself. Modernism in its endeavours to give a reasoned expression of Christianity is in accord with this principle; traditionalism cannot be.

Throughout the Christian system as displayed in the tenets of the different Churches runs the double thread of what may be named naturalism and supernaturalism, and this corresponds with the distinction we have made between knowledge and conjecture. There is the element which is in such wise intelligible that it can be followed out in conscious purposive activity, is consonant with the laws of mental action and verifiable in experience; and there is the element which rests upon conjecture, is frequently unintelligible, the product of authority and not to be verified. The proportion in which these elements are combined in the different Churches is variable, and the Church which lays most emphasis upon the supernatural is the Roman Church; this Church is therefore actually the farthest removed from the needed universality, for all supernaturalism is, and must remain, particularist while human consciousness retains its present character. A Catholic Church, in the sense intended by those who most affect the phrase, is a contradiction in terms, and those who have had experience of Christian work in other lands know how impossible it is for the Church to carry its load of conjecture over the world. Every missionary is driven to rely upon what is universal if he wants to produce a true Christian life in his disciples; he must make his teaching understood and must appeal to reason if he would break the habit of obedience to an already accepted authority. It is among those with whom authority counts for little who most readily accept a new faith.

A necessary condition of success, if an effective effort to evangelise the world is to be made, is agreement on the part of the teachers regarding what shall be taught, and this too implies that they must rely upon the universal. Since it is the conjectural element in Christianity which provides the material for the controversies upon which so much energy is expended and which has led to the formation of separate Churches, and since these controversies cannot be brought to an end because they arise from what is beyond reasonable proof or common understanding, the only possible way to the needed unity is the relegation of all conjectural matters to the domain of what the individual may hold but no Church can authoritatively teach as final truth and essential to salvation.

A teacher's first task is to rid himself of the habit of using phrases without clear understanding of what they mean. If Christ is to be set forth as the saviour of the world, the nature of the condition which is salvation and life, the steps by which it is attained, and the way in which Christ brings it about must be made more clear, and this implies study of moral and psychological problems as well as of religious. The Gospel of Christ must be proved to have the effect ascribed to it, if discipleship is to be justified. If Jesus Christ can produce a change of heart in men everywhere, it must be because He sets forth something which actually brings men into the way of righteousness, and the nature of this process must be such that it can be stated in terms of natural sequence and psychological law. Vague supernatural theories, lacking support from experience, are inadequate for the work. It can hardly be effective for all to join in proclaiming the necessity of belief in Jesus Christ if by this they mean, as they now actually do, extremely different things. No amount of amiable intercourse will conceal the fact that the Churches do not teach one way of salvation. If modernism can furnish what the world most needs it can afford to ignore the criticisms levelled at it, and it should work with clear understanding that it is called upon to restore to the Gospel of Jesus the original universality which traditionalism has destroyed. The great concerns of the human race require a firmer foundation than dubious and changing conjectures can furnish.

The demand of life is that man should find a way of reconciling his two great convictions : that the call to righteousness is a demand that must be rightly responded to, and that earthly values are relative to higher and greater values that he cannot discern because he holds a place in an order whose end is far above out of his sight. He attains to peace of soul when there is born in him the conviction that he has found a way of life which, while leading him to the highest perfection he can here realize, is also of a nature to justify his hopes that he is worthy of what further and better future the universe may hold for him, and that God too will deem him worthy. When he attains to this conviction he may look upon the chosen way of life as eternal life.

From this arises another requirement. Always there is a tendency to assert a freedom which can never be given a sufficient definition or an ordered place in any well-considered doctrine of the nature of human consciousness and of ethical life. Human progress and human happiness depend upon discovery of law and obedience to law, physical, mental and moral. The freedom man needs is only to be gained through such loyalty to law, and is the crowning achievement of life and not its presupposition. The way of life that modernism has to make clear and set forth as the way of salvation is the way of law, and the universality this implies is the true corrective of the view that the Christian Church can never be anything more than the Church of a small minority—a view which implies denial of the love of God. A Church that is content with something less than a world-wide kingdom of Christ has not realized the true nature of the ground of its life. The catholicity of the modernist is the catholicity of the universal. How this can be, we hope to show in a succeeding paper.

OUGHT A CHRISTIAN TO POSSESS WEALTH?

By the Editor.

I.

THE moral right of the individual to possess or accumulate capital is denied by the materialistic Communist on the one hand and by the Christian Idealist on the other. And the plain man, if asked whether he thought that they had the support of Jesus in this matter, would probably answer that he thought they had.

The teaching of the Christian Church about the possession of wealth has both in its precept and in its practice been of a conflicting character. In Jerusalem in the early days the Christian Church appears to have practised a voluntary communism when 'none of the disciples said aught of the things that he possessed was his own, but that they had all things in common.'

It was the practical consequences of this policy which gave St. Paul the opportunity of inaugurating among his Gentile churches his great collection of money for the 'poor saints' at Jerusalem. St. Paul himself did not encourage the institution of Communism in his Gentile churches. He was satisfied to inculcate the duty of Christian liberality and to teach the thief that he should steal no more but rather labour with his own hands the thing that is good, that he might be able to give to him that needeth. At an early date the officials of the Christian Church, particularly the Bishop and his assistants, the Deacons, were entrusted with the administration of the charity of the community which assumed in the course of time increasingly varied forms. It was that noble and cultured Archbishop of Neo-Caesaria, St. Basil (at one time the genial friend but later the unflinching opponent of the Apostate Emperor Julian), who seems to have been the first to found a great Christian hospital and infirmary. With the rise of Christian asceticism as practised by hermits and monks the surrender of all material wealth was the preliminary step to the new life. As a corporation the Chris-

tian Church steadily accumulated wealth and became by far the wealthiest corporation in Christendom. In the Middle Ages the Church in England owned more than a third of the arable land, and the monasteries, all of whose members had taken the vow of poverty, were the richest of the Christian corporations.

Francis Assisi, 'the little poor man,' 'the bridegroom of poverty,' practised the most exacting personal poverty and prescribed the same for his order of mendicant friars, both as individuals and as a corporation, but the Franciscan poverty movement soon broke down.

The Franciscan corporations became as wealthy as the other religious orders. In one of Dr. Coulton's many illuminating volumes on church life in the Middle Ages there is an illustration of a friar counting money with a stick because, being a friar, he was not permitted by the rules of his order, to touch money. Satirists were not slow to recognize some incongruity in the contrast between the poverty of the early Christian Disciples and the vast possessions of the Mediaeval Church.

A visitor to the Papal treasury watching the vast sums of money being deposited in it innocently asked the Pope, who was himself also a spectator of the scene, 'Was it not St. Peter who said silver and gold have I none?' 'That is certainly so,' replied the Pope, 'but things have improved since his day.'

Dr. Workman tells us that 'The Story of a Silver Mark' secured a wide vogue in the Middle Ages. The mark had many curious experiences: exciting, sordid, sentimental, but it achieved salvation in the end. It found its paradise with some 20,000 other silver marks in the Papal treasury at Rome.

The pre-Reformation experiment of the combination of personal poverty with corporate wealth was not continued by the Protestant Reformers, nor did State Communism appeal to them as a whole. The abhorred Anabaptists, it is true, were Communists, but they were soon stamped out. The Protestant Christian, particularly the Puritan Christian, encouraged, by his insistence on the Christian duties of industry and thrift, the accumulation of wealth; and Protestant communities soon outstripped in wealth their Papist rivals.

But how is all this to be viewed in the light of the teaching of Jesus about wealth?

II.

The teaching of Jesus about wealth, like most of His teaching, was occasional rather than systematic. It was called forth by particular incidents in His ministry. Yet how those occasional utterances ring in our ears.

> 'Sell all thou hast and give to the poor and come follow me.'
>
> 'Lay not up for yourselves treasures on earth where moth and rust doth corrupt and thieves break through and steal. But lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, for where your treasure is there will your heart be also.'
>
> 'Woe unto you ye rich, for you have received your consolation.'
>
> 'How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.'
>
> 'It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.'
>
> 'Take no bronze in your belts.'
>
> 'Take heed and beware of covetousness, for a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things he possesseth.'

But to realize the force and true significance of each of these sayings it is necessary not only to study it in its particular context, but to see it against the background of contemporary belief and feeling.

It is the fashion to call this age a materialistic age, but it is far from being as materialistic as the age in which Jesus taught. It was the conviction of His Jewish hearers that to possess wealth was to enjoy the Divine Blessing. 'The Blessing of the Lord maketh rich, and he addeth no sorrow to it.' Abraham the Father of the Faithful: Solomon the wisest of Israel's Kings: the saintly Job, were all rich men. The rich man in popular belief was particularly fitted to enter the Kingdom of God, for, as that acute observer Francis Bacon remarked, 'Prosperity was the blessing of the Old Testament.'

We see this by the surprise excited in the minds of the disciples of Jesus, themselves poor men, by His saying, 'How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the Kingdom of God,' and they exclaim, 'Who then shall be saved'? Jesus calms their apprehensions by replying, 'With men this is impossible, but not with God, for with God all things are possible.' So it was possible, even according to the teaching of Jesus, that a rich man could be saved. But it would be, as Prof. Mahaffy remarked, 'a near squeak.'

And it was this hopeful aspect of a difficult situation which was treated by that great scholar St. Clement of Alexandria in a very famous sermon (possibly the second oldest extant outside the pages of the New Testament) entitled, *Who is the rich man who is being saved?*

Another feature of the background of the teaching of Jesus about wealth was the absence of any belief in a future life or a scale of spiritual values. Traditional Jewish orthodoxy as represented by the Saducees believed neither in angels, nor in spirits, nor in the resurrection of the dead. Yet, the high priestly clan in the days of Jesus were all Saducees and were as notorious for their covetousness as for their harshness to the poor.

What should we think of the materialism of the Church of England to-day if all its archbishops and bishops and deans and archdeacons had no belief at all in a spiritual world and a future life, and seemed only to be concerned to maintain the church services for the purpose of enriching themselves and advancing their families?

Yet that represents the ecclesiastical background in the light of which we must interpret the significance of the savings of Jesus about the accumulation of riches. Jesus Himself may at one time have been a disciple of the Pharisees, and at any rate he shared with them not only their belief in a future life and a spiritual world, but also their belief that poverty was no bar to the divine favour. Yet he does not seem to have required as a condition of salvation that all rich men should renounce their wealth. Zacchaeus, the chief of the tax-gatherers, and a very rich man, gave half his fortune to the poor, but it was not at the demand of Jesus. Joseph of Arimathea, a disciple of Jesus, was also a rich man, but it is not recorded that he renounced his wealth. Jesus in the case of a rich and complacent enquirer who asked, 'What lack I yet,' said, 'Go, sell all that thou hast and give to the poor and come follow me.' But this was plainly an exceptional case.

The teaching of Jesus about wealth stresses the following points:—The danger of covetousness which made men harsh and grasping and concentrated their attention on material values and rendered them indifferent, like Bunyan's man with the muck rake, to the spiritual values and opportunities which life offered

to them. They were anxious to be rich towards men, but did not care at all about being 'rich towards God.' Wealth in their case was united to an 'evil eye,'* which made them grudging in giving and envious towards others who possessed wealth in larger measure than they did. It was the 'single eye' or 'a good eye'—the spirit of ready and willing generosity which Jesus required in the 'sons of the Kingdom,' and this was so often lacking in the rich man. Riches seemed, alas, to develop in their possessors not a spirit of generous philanthropy, but a heartless, luxurious self-indulgence. The rich man clothed in purple and fine linen, who fared sumptuously every day, had no regard whatsoever for the wretched beggar who lay at his gate full of sores. The rich fool who asks himself what he shall do with his wealth has but one answer to the question: 'Soul, thou hast much goods laid up for many years: eat, drink and enjoy thyself.'

No doubt Jesus, like the wise man, was aware of the vices produced by poverty, but we have no record in the Gospels that He said anything of them. The vices of wealth were conspicuous, and were probably unregarded or even condoned by contemporary religious teaching, and with prophetic heroism He attacked them. He observed how eager men were, as they are to-day, to secure material wealth for themselves and how utterly indifferent they were to the spiritual values in life, and so with dramatic force He bids them 'lay up for themselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt and where thieves do not break through and steal.'

It was this power of accumulated wealth to blind men's eyes to a true perception of life's values that He summed up in that remarkable phrase 'the deceitfulness (or, more correctly, the deceivableness) of riches.' He noted, moreover, another characteristic bred in those whose hearts were set upon material things. It was a spirit of anxiety lest they should lose their material possessions. The enjoyment to-day was destroyed by anxiety for to-morrow. His remedy was to put spiritual things first in life, to make the securing of them a man's primary interest. 'Seek

* In the Old Testament, the New Testament and Rabbinical literature the term 'evil eye' is used to express a grudging, mean, envious spirit. Readers of the Bible and even commentators in some cases do not seem to be aware of this and connect the term with magic and witchcraft, which is a Europaean and not a Jewish meaning of the term.

ye first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all things needful for this life shall be added unto you.'

It is not possible to say with conviction that Jesus would have said to any young man who proposed to enter upon a business career and to make the accumulation of capital or the possession of capital his life's work, 'It is not right for you to do so.' He might well, as we have seen, warn him against the temptations of his occupation. He would have pointed him to the true riches which if a man acquire not he is poor indeed. He might have pointed out how even the mammon of unrighteousness so often used for base and selfish purposes can be used for higher ends.

It is the doctrine of the Stewardship of Wealth which is one of the most characteristic features of the teaching of Jesus about wealth. It is not the acquisition of wealth that He forbids or the surrender of it that He demands, but the right use of it by him who is entrusted with it. In His eyes no man is the absolute possessor of material wealth. He is but a steward entrusted with its administration, and in that administration it is his duty to carry out the will of the owner, who is God, and not to follow his own selfish desires, realizing above all that for this administration of wealth he must render a strict account to its owner.

III.

It is in loyalty to this Christian doctrine of the Stewardship of Wealth rather than to the more drastic ideals of 'holy poverty' and 'communistic possession' that the true welfare of the individual and of the community may be best achieved. A brilliant modern sociologist has pointed out to us 'the sickness of an acquisitive society,' and certainly there is a sickness both economic and spiritual not only of the acquisitive society but also of the acquisitive individual.

But we cannot forget in this period of economic distress that if there be the danger of the sickness of an acquisitive society, there is the still greater danger of the starvation of a non-acquisitive society. Wealth has got to be acquired and accumulated and conserved if human life is to be preserved and human civilization is to advance. The great Dr. Johnson, and not least great in this that he sought to clear his mind of cant, said on one

occasion that men were seldom so innocently employed as when making money. He did not mean, of course, by gambling or speculation, still less by oppression or fraud, but by honourable, intelligent and industrious activities.

Idealists are tempted to speak contemptuously of acquisitiveness, but, as Edmund Burke condemned the folly of those who would bring an indictment against a whole nation, so a judicious man will hesitate to condemn a practice which is natural and universal. Acquisitiveness in the creative process we first observe in the sphere of mechanics, and in chemistry crystals are a good example of it. And we may regard their acquisitiveness as non-moral. In the biological world the exercise of acquisitiveness by an organism is a necessary condition of its survival and growth; it competes with other organisms in this form of activity, and by this competition in acquisition, an important factor in biological evolution is brought into operation.

We may assume that in the vegetable world the exercise of acquisitiveness is non-moral. In the animal world acquisitiveness also reigns, and there the superficial observer may see in it the exercise of something which is solely selfish, but he is deceived. Insects like ants and bees and wasps acquire not simply for their individual selves, but as much, or even more, for their community and their offspring.

Thus the acquisitiveness which we see originally as a mechanical or chemical force, and then becoming an instinctive biological activity, assumes a moral character in the higher forms of life. The acquisitiveness of selfishness is supplemented, if not transformed entirely, by the acquisitiveness of altruism. Acquisitiveness is natural to human nature. We may persuade men temporarily to abstain from exercising it or to pretend that they do not, but there is no reasonable probability that either a Gautama or a Lenin will be able to extirpate it from the human species. Our only hope lies in its transformation and sublimation.

It was the shrewd Thomas Fuller who observed that these natural passions of human beings were not weeds to be rooted up but wild plants to be cultivated. And Bishop Joseph Butler maintained that man's moral education and probation was exercised in discerning the right use of, and then rightly using, these natural passions.

Acquisitiveness is undoubtedly one of these natural passions, and, rightly used, it may develop in the individual powers of intelligence, energy, diligence, concentration, self-denial, unselfishness and administrative ability, all of which may do as much to perfect his own personality as to benefit the community in which he lives. The State has an undoubted right to decide under what limitations material wealth may be acquired, held and used, but if the State be wise it will not seek to extirpate acquisitiveness from human nature, but to transform and inspire acquisitiveness so that it may be used by men to promote increasingly in many-sided fashion the welfare of humanity. In doing this the State will not find it possible to stress a more fruitful and more inspiring ideal than that set forth by our Lord, that the human possessor and user of material wealth should act as the steward of God.

A PAULINE CREED

By the Rev. E. P. Boys-Smith, M.A.

LATELY a friend who knew and liked the Johannine creed circulated by the Modern Churchmen's Union raised the question whether a similar creed in Pauline language could be drawn from the earlier apostle's writings, and if so how the two would compare in their presentment of Christian belief. He urged me to make the attempt, if only as an experiment. And on my doing so and submitting the result to his consideration, he further urged that with some exposition it should be laid before the consideration of others, as having a general interest, and throwing some light on the development of Christian belief and the varied proportion of it in Christian minds of different type. So it is that I submit what follows: not at all with the object of putting it into rivalry with the Johannine creed mentioned, still less with the historical creeds of the Church. I have no wish to propound an alternative creed for general use; but a study of St. Paul's vital beliefs, and of the form they might have taken if he had set himself to express them in a creed, is not without its value. I will first give such a creed, drawn entirely from the Pauline Epistles in both substance and phraseology, and will then subjoin some remarks for which it gives occasion.

WE BELIEVE IN GOD, AND WITH ONE MOUTH GLORIFY THE GOD AND FATHER OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST, WHO WAS DECLARED TO BE THE SON OF GOD WITH POWER ACCORDING TO THE SPIRIT OF HOLINESS BY THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD;[1] WHO GAVE HIMSELF FOR OUR SINS;[2] WHO IS THE IMAGE OF THE INVISIBLE GOD, THE FIRST-BORN OF ALL CREATION, FOR IN HIM WERE ALL THINGS CREATED;[3] THROUGH WHOM WE HAVE OUR ACCESS IN ONE SPIRIT TO THE FATHER.[4] WE ACKNOWLEDGE THEM THAT ARE CONSECRATED IN CHRIST JESUS, CALLED TO BE SAINTS, WITH ALL THAT CALL UPON THE NAME OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST IN EVERY PLACE,[5] WHICH IS THE CHURCH OF THE LIVING GOD, THE PILLAR AND SEAT OF THE TRUTH.[6] AND WE CONFESS THAT THE WAGES OF SIN IS DEATH, BUT THE FREE GIFT OF GOD IS ETERNAL LIFE IN CHRIST JESUS OUR LORD.[7]

Within the compass of what might serve for a creed, only the broad outlines of belief can be rightly given; it would be easy to point to many features of St. Paul's belief which are not here included. For instance, he held that the Christ was a son of David, and that the Church is the true Israel; but these beliefs were incidental rather than central, and the vital element in them is sufficiently expressed in different phraseology in the foregoing profession. Again, fundamental beliefs were sometimes expressed by the apostle more pointedly than in the sentence quoted; *e.g.*, the crucifixion is more forcibly emphasized in the passionate avowal, 'I determined not to know anything among you save Jesus Christ, and him crucified'; and so is the resurrection both of the Lord and of his followers in that other affirmation, 'Now hath Christ been raised from the dead, the first-fruits of them that are asleep.' But these convictions find place clearly enough in the creed compiled, and nothing would be gained by reinforcing them. What is more important is to consider what are the salient features of such a creed as the foregoing, when it is set in comparison with any other, whether that be the Nicene, or the Apostles', or the Johannine creed already referred to.

In any Christian creed the Lord Jesus Christ must be central, and this has always been so. But in the creed of St. Paul that is still more marked. His name occurs again and again from begin-

[1] *Rom.* i, 1-4. [2] *Gal.* i, 3. [3] *Col.* i, 15-16. [4] *Eph.* ii, 18.
[5] *I Cor.* i, 2. [6] *I Tim.* iii, 15. [7] *Rom.* vi, 23.

ning to end, and every conviction gains its significance from its relation to him. 'God' has meaning because He is the God and Father of Jesus Christ, through whom our access to Him is discovered. Creation has meaning because in origin and in outcome it is related to him. The Church has meaning only because it must be defined as the community which centres in him, and owes its cohesion to the living bond he constitutes and the truth of life he embodies. Apart from him, death is the inevitable doom of all; but there is in him an alternative, and this is an eternal life which has meaning because it is the life seen and known in him. If Jesus Christ were cut out of this creed nothing at all would remain. There would not be a residual theism, nor an abstract expectation of immortality, nor a practical assurance of a physical world, nor the authority of an ecclesiastical institution — there would be just nothing. As St. Paul himself says, 'Christ is all, and in all.' There is no other creed of which that can be said in quite the same degree.

A second feature, closely akin to this, is that this creed is permeated with a sense of redemption and hope which gives it all through a characteristic fervour. The awe which is awaked in the presence of God is not here the colder prostration before the face of the Almighty; nor even primarily the humbling of him who looks on the High and Holy One; it is rather the wonder of him who beholds the glory of God made manifest in the Son of His Love, by whom we were delivered out of the power of darkness and translated into His royalty and light. This is the creed of an enthusiast; of a soul that is free and rejoicing in the sunlight of Divine Love. More than most creeds it would lend itself to worship. It is full of thought, and provokes thought on the very heights of life; but the strenuous thought which is here, is far more concerned with aspiration than with definition: the range is greater than the grasp, sure as is the grip of truth.

A distinction has been drawn between creeds of fact and creeds of truth. This distinction has some practical value, though it is not logically tenable, for truth has no meaning unless founded on fact, and facts have no meaning except in the context of truth. Adopting this distinction for the moment, it may be asked, Into which class does this Pauline creed come? It is

not a creed of historical incidents: nor is it one of general propositions. It is a creed of experience; in which the main fact is that of personality, and the main truth is the relation of the believer to the Lord, a personal experience of spiritual life. Is not that the character which a Christian creed ought to have?

In this connexion a word is required on the description of the Church as consisting of 'them that are consecrated . . . called to be saints . . .' The rendering of the E.V.V. 'sanctified' misrepresents. ἁγιάζω points to the *beginning* of Christian life, not to its final culmination. Baptism is the normal act of consecration, and is the beginning of making a disciple (*Mt.* xxviii, 19-20). Unfortunately English supplies no corresponding noun for 'one consecrated,' and 'saint' is the only term available, though its associations are misleading. It should bear in this context no implication of perfection, or even eminent spirituality; it is simply equivalent to what is meant to-day by 'Christian.'

To some it may seem serious that certain beliefs included in the historic creeds find no mention here. There is no word, *e.g.*, relating to the Virgin birth, or the descent into Hell, no dating of the Passion to the time of Pontius Pilate, no reference to the Ascension, nor expressly to a Judgment to come; and there is no theological definition of the Incarnation or Eternal Generation, nor any metaphysical relation of the Divine Father and the Divine Son. But is this serious? Beliefs which are unexpressed are not thereby denied. A Pauline creed must be one at an early stage of Christian belief; there had not been time for that reflection and discussion which issued three centuries later in the doctrinal decisions or agreements to which the fourth century creeds bear witness. And if a creed is to be 'a thing of catholic consent,' it is no small advantage that it should be simple, and confined to the religious fundamentals of Christian belief. If free from elaborations of controversy, and from the intellectual accretions which belong to a particular historical situation and its mental atmosphere, which are so hard to escape when a religious impulse is crystallized in a definite form, it is the more truly catholic. Some of the points omitted here were certainly not salient in the thought and faith of St. Paul; *e.g.* nowhere in his writings is there allusion to the Virgin birth, or to the descent into Hell. These are not essentials of Christianity, whether true

or otherwise, for it is certain St. Paul did not found his spiritual life upon them, and who will maintain the paradox that for lack of them he was no true Christian? He did certainly believe in the religious fact of the Lord's Ascension,[8] though he does not disclose his thoughts about the mode of Christ's withdrawal. He did believe the Passion could be dated by Pilate's Proconsulship.[9] And he assuredly believed in a Judgment to come.[10] But no creed can include the whole range of any man's belief; it is enough if it rehearses the main things that he lives by. It should also present in proportion the faith that is in him. The foregoing creed drawn from St. Paul's writings, and preserving his own words, perhaps comes near to doing this. With few clauses in the Nicene creed would he have felt a more lively sympathy than with this, 'Who for us men, and for our salvation, came down from Heaven'; and the whole of the Pauline creed above given discloses that standpoint in its outlook on Christian life and hope.

To some other minds there may seem to be a more serious omission in this Pauline creed; they may perhaps feel that it is barely Trinitarian, and may desire some more explicit confession of the Holy Spirit. Let any such remember that while the *grounds* of Trinitarian belief were present from the beginning, its definite expression belongs to a later age. In the New Testament there is no difference between 'the Spirit of Holiness' and 'the Holy Spirit'; and the former phrase does find a place in this Pauline creed. But this opens up a large enquiry, and only an outline of the solution can be given here. In no section of the New Testament does 'spirit'—πνεῦμα—occur so often as in the Pauline Epistles, and what it stands for fills a larger place in the Christian outlook of this apostle than of anyone else whose mind is fully known. But the meaning which the word bears passes through many shades in different contexts, and is never quite what it came to be three centuries later in the creeds. Originally the word πνεῦμα, like all of this formation ending in μα, expressed the *result* of the kindred verb's action. As πνέω means 'I breathe,' πνεῦμα means the breath sent out. The old story of creation tells how God breathed into the man a breath of life to make him a living soul; and throughout the

[8] *Col.* iii, 1. [9] *I Tim.* vi, 13. [10] *Rom.* ii, 16; *Acts* xxiv, 25.

Scriptures this sense of a breath of life bestowed is the fundamental meaning. Usually in the writings of St. Paul the word stands for what we should express in English by 'inspiration' rather than 'spirit'; it is a spiritual gift from above, not the Giver, that is indicated. But it means at other times either the higher life to which a man is lifted when this bestowal of Divine life is received; or the highest life which is in a man as made in God's likeness, and truly a son of His, which is the recipient of the gift of life and is by it reinforced. Such a bestowal of life, Divine in its origin and nature, may be made on the Christian community, or on an individual disciple, or as a particular impulse or message — 'a godly motion'; in any of these cases it will be called 'spirit.' A careful reading of *I Cor.* xii, 3-13, in conjunction with xiv, 26-33, shows this clearly enough. Where 'spirit' takes on a more personal sense, it is always in identification with God, or with Jesus Christ, though it is still not without the consciousness that human experience of contact with the Divine is the fact in view: *cf. Gal.* iv, 6; *Rom.* viii, 9-11; *II Cor.* iii, 16-18. One passage is especially instructive and especially difficult, *viz. I Cor.* ii, 10-16. In these few verses 'spirit' occurs eight times, and the corresponding adjective or adverb four times more. The shade of meaning is different in almost every case, but the fundamental meaning is the same throughout, and it is only confusing to print the word with a capital letter in some cases and not in others, as the E.V.V. do. That is to read into St. Paul's words a distinction which was not in his thought; and the conclusion, 'we have the mind of Christ,' might, and but for the influence of the preceding quotation probably would, just as well have run 'we have the spirit of Christ.' From all this it follows that the Pauline creed given above does not lie open to criticism on the ground that it does not contain express Trinitarian belief. In this it is faithful to the belief of the apostle. And it would be spiritually helpful in these modern days if our minds were less under the domination of dogmatic language concerning the Spirit. For this belongs to an intellectual stage which is neither that of the apostolic Christians nor of ourselves. We should then be open more to the religious experience which they and we alike may have if we draw near to the only Giver of Life, through Jesus Christ.

THE LITTLE BLACK SHAW

AND HIS MISADVENTURES IN HIS SEARCH FOR GOD.*

By Canon B. H. Streeter, M.A., D.D., Ireland Professor of Exigesis in the University of Oxford.

THE Adventures of the Black Girl in her Search for God is a characteristically Shavian variant on the theme of *The Pilgrim's Progress*. It may not throw much light on the nature of God; but it throws a good deal on that of Mr. Bernard Shaw —a matter which, if less important, is still not without interest to many of his fellow human beings.

'So I awoke, and behold it was a dream.' It can hardly be an accident that this latest attempt to present the quest of the soul for the Ultimate, like so many of its predecessors, is in the form of an allegory. Dreams, say the psychologists, and the myths and allegories which are the dream-creation of the artist's mind, express in symbolic form more of the sub-conscious life of the dreamer or artist than he may himself surmise. Our expectation that this particular myth may do this is enhanced by reading Mr. Shaw's account of how he was 'inspired' to write it:

> 'My intention was to write a play in the ordinary course of my business as a playwright, but I found myself writing the story of the Black Girl instead, and now, the story being written, I proceed to speculate what it means, though I cannot too often repeat that I am as liable as anyone else to err in my interpretation.'

If, then, one of his readers—with the frank admission of a similar liability to error—has the fancy to play with the experiment of applying to a story so inspired the methods of dream-interpretation which the world owes to Freud, Mr. Shaw cannot reasonably feel aggrieved. He opens by explaining the Christianity, in which his Black Girl has been instructed, by the psycho-analytical theory of masochism, and to this topic he continually recurs. He can hardly, then, take offence if in the course of our experiment the searchlight, which he himself applies to the religious and moral psychology of other people, should be turned upon his own. Indeed, it would almost seem as if the idea of doing so had occurred to the sub-conscious, if not also to the conscious, mind of Mr. John Farleigh, whose illustrations

* Reprinted, with some additions, from *The Newsletter*.

are so brilliant an interpretation of the text; for as a kind of colophon to the book, there stands a beautifully-conceived design, a spearhead piercing a (presumably Irish) harp, the symbolism of which may be dark to Mrs. Grundy but to no one familiar with psycho-analytic literature.

The Black Girl in the allegory I take to be the soul of Mr. Bernard Shaw. There are people who would like to think of their souls as at least potentially white; but Mr. Shaw would die rather than have this supposed. He is on the side of the angels, but not for anything would he be thought to look like one. The Black Girl is inordinately proud—the point is continually reiterated—of being naked and unashamed. We are reminded, in *Man and Superman*, of the protestations of Tanner, an earlier impersonation of the Shavian soul:

> 'Thief, liar, forger, adulterer, perjurer, glutton, drunkard? Not one of these names fit me. You have to fall back on my deficiency in shame. Well, I admit it. I even congratulate myself; for if I were ashamed of my real self, I should cut as stupid a figure as any of the rest of you. Cultivate a little impudence, Ramsden, and you will become quite a remarkable man.'

The Black Girl starts with her Bible (a natural symbol of moral earnestness) as a guide; besides this—which rapidly dwindles in size—her whole equipment is a knobkerry with which to smash the idols, whether of religion or of science. So, thirty years ago, the Shaw that speaks through Tanner:

> 'The moral passion has taken my destructiveness in hand and directed it to moral ends. I have become a reformer, and, like all reformers, an iconoclast. I no longer break cucumber frames and burn gorse bushes: I shatter creeds and demolish idols.'

The Black Girl's search takes her through various phases—the God of Noah, so called, Job's God, Micah and Ecclesiastes are in turn disposed of. Scientific materialism, in the guise of a professor enthusiastic for Pavlov's experiments on dogs' saliva, is genially chaffed. Then comes a scene, made vivid by a marvellous illustration of a Roman soldier guarding a cross with the legend 'S.P.Q.R.,' which exhibits Mr. Shaw's loathing of any kind of established authority and his acute revulsion from even the ghost of anything masochistic. In this matter of masochism methinks our author doth protest too much. Psychologists say that we are apt to object most strongly to characteristics which exist in our own persons in a repressed form; and we may recall that thirty years ago Mr. Shaw confessed:

> 'I assure you that I sometimes dislike myself so much that when some irritable reviewer chances at that moment to pitch into me with zest, I feel unspeakably relieved and obliged.'

One wonders whether, as a small boy, there were times when Mr. Shaw had too severe a whipping—which yet he felt was perhaps deserved, even though the fun was worth the price.

The next event is a dialogue between the Black Girl and Christ, who is represented as a conjuror. Mr. Shaw does not really think that Christ was a conjuror, but he knows that he will annoy some people if he says so—besides, 'twill do as a hit at transubstantiation. Next comes a choice bit of sheer fun:

> 'A mile further on she met an ancient fisherman carrying an enormous cathedral on his shoulders.
>
> '"Take care: it will break your poor old back," she cried, running to help him.
>
> '"Not it," he replied cheerfully. "I am the rock on which this church is built."
>
> '"But you are not a rock; and it is too heavy for you," she said, expecting every moment to see him crushed by its weight.
>
> '"No fear," he said, grinning pleasantly at her. "It is made entirely of paper." And he danced past her, making all the bells in the cathedral tinkle merrily.'

In the Black Girl's encounter with a party of scientific explorers, the author of *The Doctor's Dilemma* has a chance for another dig at Science. Then comes the scene with the image-maker carving a crucifix, indicating that the soul of Mr. Shaw has felt the lure of the great art traditions which religion has inspired, especially (as he tells us later) 'the magic of word-music' in the Authorized Version of the Bible. In the dialogue with Mahommed Mr. Shaw's admiration for his blank monotheism, coupled with his dislike of the Mahommedan attitude towards woman, is amusingly brought out. In this scene occurs a passage where, for half a page, the language has the lilt of poetry: 'Since I was a child I have meditated on numbers and wondered how the number one came . . .' Something in the rhythm of the words hints at the mystic's rapture, the flight of the Alone to the Alone; but in true Shavian spirit, by a sudden twist it is turned to ridicule. Yet cannot this number one be a dream-symbol, not only for the Infinite, but also for the Ego—an Ego sensitively defensive, almost neurotically fearful of succumbing to a religious idealism and a simple human kindliness to which it is secretly attracted. Perhaps, if Shaw could just for once let himself go to this Ego, he might really find

God. But, as the Black Girl is told later on, to find God is to court the fate of Semele, who, when Jupiter reveals himself, 'shrivelled up and cracked like a flea in the fire.' Does Mr. Shaw's sub-conscious mind fear that, if he *were* to find God, he might (by a process of psychological abreaction) become—at least during a period of purgation—a romantic sentimentalist enthusiastic over *bourgeoise* religion, love and virtue.

At last the Black Girl finds Voltaire, and helps him to cultivate his garden. But Voltaire is not up-to-date. 'There's a lot been found out about podatoes since he learnt to dig them,' says the wild, red-haired Irishman whom she is persuaded, first to tolerate, and then to marry. By this marriage we are, presumably, to understand that Mr. Shaw's soul has reluctantly made up its mind to make the best of Mr. Shaw's philosophy.

> 'God is not properly made and finished yet. There's somethin' in us that's dhrivin' at him, and somethin' out of us that's dhrivin' at him: that's certain; and the only other thing that's certain is that the somethin' makes plenty of mistakes in thryin' to get there.'

Managing the Irishman and their children keeps the Black Girl very busy and reasonably contented:

> 'But there were moments . . . in which her mind went back to her search, and a new question arose: "Suppose I had found God at home, what should I have done when he hinted that I was staying too long and that he had other things to attend to?"'

It is, one may remark, a curious question to have arisen in the mind of one who has so completely thrown off all primitive ideas of God; only a God with the most strictly anthropomorphic limitations would find difficulty in dealing with more than one person or thing at the same time. Finally, when the children have grown up, 'her strengthened mind had taken her far beyond the stage at which there is any fun in smashing idols with knobkerries.'

With these words ends the dream; now for Mr. Shaw's own interpretation thereof. Incredible as it may appear, it looks as if he would have the reader take as serious description his series of dream caricatures of the several stages in the religious development of man.

Incidentally, he has got the stages in the wrong order. Even without the assistance of a friendly higher critic it should have been evident to him that the moralization of the conception of God by Micah (and other prophets) must have preceded, not

followed, the book of Job. For the problem treated in that marvellous poetic drama, the possibility of reconciling the fact of suffering with the goodness of God, only comes into existence after it has been long and emphatically affirmed that God is good. The author of this poem, knowing that to this problem he has no intellectual solution, yet does not despair—that is his greatness. Yet Mr. Shaw, apparently in all seriousness, can write, 'Job's God is a very bad debater, unless indeed we give him credit for deliberately saving himself from defeat by the old expedient: "No case: abuse the plaintiff's attorney."' It is as though we were listening to an elementary schoolboy making witty remarks about the 'funny' figures in some masterpiece of Chinese painting.

No less in his account of Jesus does Mr. Shaw display his contempt for mere history. A study of actual documents has convinced most scholars that the Fourth Gospel is the latest and least historical of the four. This Gospel—or rather a misinterpretation of it—is for him the starting-point of his historical reconstruction; all the rest is made up of Shavian *flair*. 'Pseudo-Christianity,' he concludes, 'was, and always will be, fact proof'; in that respect it resembles Mr. Shaw.

Mr. Shaw must have been so busy keeping him abreast of the times in other matters that it is perhaps unreasonable to expect his theology to be absolutely up-to-date. But it *is* surprising to be told: 'At present we are at a crisis in which one party is keeping the Bible in the clouds in the name of religion, and another is trying to get rid of it altogether in the name of Science.' We do not all reside at Drayton, Tennessee. If instead of the words 'at present' Mr. Shaw had written 'half a century ago,' he would have accurately dated that crisis.

The 'importance of the message' which 'at the present world crisis' he has embodied in his tale of the Black Girl is, he tells us, briefly this. 'Mere agnosticism leads nowhere'; the same is true of scientific materialism and of fundamentalist religion. On this last the knobkerry must fall 'with might and main'—but the knobkerry does not represent the last word of wisdom. This may be a new idea to 'advanced thinkers' like Mr. Shaw; but in the intellectual and moral backwaters of this country, such as the ancient Universities so much despised by

Mr. Shaw, this series of propositions has for fifty years or more appeared self-evident; and in these homes of lost causes persons minded to seek adventure in the search for God have taken them for granted—not as the climax of their quest, but as its starting-point.

THE PRAYER BOOK OF KING'S CHAPEL, BOSTON*

By the Reverend JOHN CARROLL PERKINS, Minister of the King's Chapel, Boston, U.S.A.

IN Proctor and Frere's *A New History of the Book of Common Prayer*, London, 1902, p. 222, it is said: 'There was going on all through the eighteenth century a series of agitations in favour of a fresh revision, carried on mainly in the interest of those who sympathized with anti-Trinitarian views. These came nearer to recognition in America than in England.' And a footnote on the same page says that, 'At the back of a great part of the movement lay the proposals of Dr. Clarke as to revision of the Prayer Book, in the third part of his Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity, condemned by Convocation in 1714.'

Toward the end of his life Dr. Samuel Clarke, Rector of St. James, Piccadilly, took a Prayer Book, dated 1724, and interleaving it, crossed out passages from the text according to his will and wrote his suggestions on the added leaves. The book was never published, nor intended, as Dr. Clarke wrote in it, to be more than 'amendments humbly proposed to the consideration of those in authority.'

Dr. Clarke died in 1729. His book was given to the British Museum by his son Mr. Samuel Clarke, F.R.S., in 1768. This book was consulted by the Rev. Theophilus Lindsey when he published his book of prayer, 'Reformed according to the Plan of the late Dr. Samuel Clarke' for his congregation in Essex Hall, London, in 1774.

The Rev. John Disney, associate with and successor to Mr. Lindsey, made two copies of Dr. Clarke's prayer-book. One is

* This article constitutes an interesting supplement to the article entitled 'An Eighteenth Century Revision of the Book of Common Prayer,' published in our issue of May, 1932.—ED. *M.C.*

at present in the Williams Library in Gordon Square, London. The other was given by Mr. Disney to Samuel Provoost, 'my contemporary at Peter's College, Cambridge,' just before his consecration as Bishop of New York, in Lambeth Palace, February 4th, 1787, 'in the earnest hope that it might be useful at some time, on a further revisal of the present Liturgy of the Protestant Church in America; so that they might in their public devotion acknowledge and worship none other than the one and only living and true God.' This copy is probably no longer in existence.

Dr. James Freeman, minister of the King's Chapel in Boston, U.S.A., with his Wardens and Vestry published 'A Liturgy, collected principally from the Book of Common Prayer for the use of the First Episcopal Church in Boston,' in the year 1785. In his preface Dr. Freeman writes: 'In compiling this Liturgy great assistance hath been derived from the judicious corrections of the Reverend Mr. Lindsey, who hath reformed the Book of Common Prayer according to the Plan of the truly pious and justly celebrated Doctor Samuel Clarke.' Dr. Freeman did not know Dr. Clarke's book, except by correspondence with Mr. Lindsey.

The King's Chapel was established when Robert Ratcliffe, a Chaplain of James II, arrived in Boston in 1686 and read the liturgy of the Church of England for the first time in public. This was the first Episcopal Church in New England; and became the chief centre of the religious and missionary work of the Church of England in a hostile Puritan community down to 1775.

When the American Colonies separated from Great Britain many Church problems arose both of administration and doctrine. There had been no bishop in the colonies, and the organization of the Protestant Episcopal Church in America proceeded slowly. Anti-Trinitarian views were very common among the clergy and laymen of the Episcopal Churches as well as among the other clergy. There were no precedents for the existing situation, and various states took independent action.

In 1783 the clergy of Connecticut chose the Rev. Samuel Seabury as their bishop. He went to London for consecration. But he waited vainly for sixteen months because the Archbishops were hesitant about acting without civil authority. In November

1784 he finally received consecration at Aberdeen at the hands of the Scotch Episcopal Church; but such action was not satisfactory to all, because of the relations of that Church with the Church of England.

In the matter of a prayer book the King's Chapel of Boston took the initiative and in 1785 published the first revision of the English Book of Common Prayer ever to be printed in America. That book, 'according to the Plan' of Dr. Samuel Clarke with minor changes, is still in use. The same year a Church Convention was held in New York, attended by delegates from the states of New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina. A book called a *Proposed Book* of Common Prayer was adopted and printed in 1786. It was reprinted in London with the title of *The American Prayer Book*. In this book the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds were omitted; the Apostles Creed dropped the phrase 'he descended into hell'; the Thirty-Nine Articles were reduced to twenty. There were many other changes.

In 1789 the first General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in America, at which all the states were represented, was held in Philadelphia and a Prayer Book was published superceding all others. The King's Chapel in Boston, however, was persistent in maintaining the anti-Trinitarian views held by its members. They insisted on the use of their own liturgy. They hoped their opinions might prevail in the newly-organized Protestant Episcopal Church. They retained the name, 'The First Episcopal Church in Boston.' In 1787, desiring to have their minister, the Rev. James Freeman, properly ordained, they applied to Bishop Seabury of Connecticut. After Freeman had visited him and answered his questions, Bishop Seabury refused to proceed further. Application was then made to Bishop Provoost, of New York, who was a friend of John Disney and held anti-Trinitarian views similar to those of Dr. Clarke. Provoost was quite sympathetic but delayed action. The Church then proceeded 'by virtue of the third article in the Declaration of Rights' to ordain Freeman, the Senior Warden, Thomas Bulfinch, laying his hands upon him. At the same time, conscious of the irregularity, a statement was entered in their records that if in the future Episcopal ordination might be obtained 'with-

out sacrificing our own religious sentiments to those of others,' they would gladly take advantage of it. For nearly fifty years the prayer for Bishops was retained in the Liturgy.

Mr. Lindsey in his Book of Common Prayer speaks of 'the Plan of the late Dr. Samuel Clarke.' That phrase passed into common use. It was repeated by Dr. Freeman in Boston, U.S.A. A book for Protestant Dissenters following that 'plan' was printed in Manchester in 1789; another in Plymouth in 1791; another in Mansfield in 1797. And many other Churches in England calling themselves Arian, or Socinian, or Unitarian, gave Dr. Clarke credit for their liturgical changes. In America, while Dr. Clarke's suggestions had influenced many Episcopal Churches, that influence largely ceased after the organization of the Protestant Episcopal Church in 1789.

The Unitarian movement in America grew among Congregationalists, and chiefly in New England. The King's Chapel in Boston was the only Episcopal Church that avowedly continued to follow Dr. Clarke's anti-Trinitarianism. It alone preserved its Book of Common Prayer. In the nineteenth century a few Churches adopted the King's Chapel book, but did not continue its use. In 1893 the American Unitarian Association printed a Book of Praise and Prayer for Congregational Worship containing ten services. The last of these is the order of Morning and Evening Prayer found in the King's Chapel book.

The 'plan' of Dr. Clarke, so far as it affected the King's Chapel Liturgy, concerned the Trinity and the worship of Christ and a modification of priestly authority. All phrases implying the Trinity, unless found in the Bible, were changed; and all prayers directed to Christ were so modified that they were made to God through Christ. Trinity Sunday was dropped from the Calendar; and the Sundays from Whit-Sunday to Advent were named in order with their Collects and Gospels and Epistles, as 'after Whit-Sunday.' The Apostles Creed was retained, but followed Lindsey in omitting the belief of the descent into hell, the belief in the Holy Catholic Church and the Communion of Saints. The Saints' Days were kept in order, and unchanged except to modify the doctrines of the Trinity. Most of the usual offices of Church administration were kept; but Confirmation, later restored, Commination, the Service of

Prayer to be used at sea, the ordering of Deacons and Priests, and the Consecration of Bishops, and all services relating to Royalty were omitted. The Litany was kept with a few changes. The Thirty-Nine Articles and the Constitutions and Canons Ecclesiastical were not retained. For the *Gloria Patri*, I *Tim.* i, 17 was substituted, with the addition of 'through Christ' before 'for ever and ever.' The doxology which Dr. Clarke had suggested, 'Glory be to God, by Jesus Christ, through the heavenly assistance of the Holy Spirit, as it was in the beginning,' etc., Lindsey had already rejected for a fusion of I *Tim.* i, 17, with *Romans* xvi, 27.

In the prayer for the Clergy and People Dr. Clarke had suggested for 'who alone workest great marvels' the phrase, 'who art the Author of every good and perfect gift.' Dr. Freeman adopted this phrase, as did also the revisers of the book for the Protestant Episcopal Church of the U.S.A.

Dr. Clarke called the Prayer of St. Chrysostom 'A Concluding Prayer.' Dr. Freeman accepted that caption, and while rejecting Dr. Clarke's phrase 'who hath graciously permitted us' in place of 'who hath given us grace,' followed him in substituting for the words 'dost promise that when two or three are gathered together in Thy name' the following: 'and hast promised *by thy beloved Son*, that when (Freeman has where) two or three are gathered together in His name,' etc.

In the Litany Dr. Freeman took Clarke's phrase, 'death unprepared for,' in place of 'sudden death.' In the Declaration of Absolution or Remission of Sins, Dr. Freeman follows Dr. Clarke in striking out the words that imply the minister's authority of granting forgiveness; but he does not adopt Dr. Clarke's phraseology otherwise.

The *Te Deum* is kept practically unchanged except where Christ is identified with God, *i.e.* 'thou hast redeemed *through his most* precious blood' for 'with thy precious blood.'

The King's Chapel Prayer Book follows the phraseology of the English Prayer Book far more closely than any other book that claims the plan of Dr. Clarke. Dr. Clarke made many verbal changes that the best English use could not endure. This may be one reason why the King's Chapel book has persisted so satisfactorily to the present time in the place of its origin.

BIRTH CONTROL: A PLEA FOR REALISM

By F. G. Layton, M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., J.P.

I AM a doctor, but I would plead also other credentials for venturing upon discussion of this subject. I do so because the subject raises issues other than the obvious medical ones.

I was born and brought up in a vicarage. I was put into my father's choir so soon as I could read, and later on sang in my choir-school from the age of eleven till my voice broke. That was a joyous happening. As a not too miserable choir-school boy I was condemned for three years to three sermons each Sunday in the summer. Yet even that did not cure me of my childish hopes. I was destined to the priesthood from my earliest days, and I left the choir-school for the big school in the Strand (it is there no longer) in the sure and certain belief that I should become a parson like my father. I do not quite know what happened—I have a hazy memory that frequent compulsory repetition of the Litany had something to do with it, and perhaps the multitudinous sermons—but this is certain: some bishop escaped, narrowly, having me as one of his clergy. I gave up the idea of becoming a preacher and became instead a practitioner, but a clergyman's interests have remained in part my own.

I suggest that the question of Birth Control is of equal importance to both clergy and doctors. The ignorant idea is that a doctor is concerned solely with the bodily part of man: a parson with the spiritual. That idea is entirely untrue. Each has his approach; but if either fails to realize that his job is to deal with men and women *wholly*, he is gravely in error. On the surface first, what faces us? Just this—that many children are born into the world without thought, without preparation and without any consideration for the future.

I remember, many years ago, being called late at night to a horrible house. As I splashed up an entry through pools of muddy water, I cursed my fate. In a bare room on a bed was a woman; and presently there was a baby also. That room was

furnished with a bed, an empty box, a cinder-fire. Beyond that there was nothing. There was no nightdress for the woman: there was not a vestige of anything in which to clothe the baby. A general practitioner is not often at a loss, but there was even nothing in which to wash the new-born baby—not the lowliest of utensils. There was no water and no soap. Providentially a midwife turned up from somewhere and took over the care of the woman and the baby while I went off and aroused my wife and collected the sort of things women and babies wear on such occasions. It was an interesting if perplexing night's work. What was the point of that exceedingly undesired birth? The baby came into an existence of unrelieved poverty and, if it has survived, then in all probability only to beget another for this generation to a fresh life of unrelieved poverty. I recollect again seven small houses clustered round a yard littered with broken bricks and other rubbish. There is one water-tap to supply the washing and drinking of the residents. My business was a very small, exceedingly unhealthy baby who was having fits. Babies in back-street courts so often have fits. The mother was thirty-five years old. She had had eleven babies, including twins twice. Ten of the eleven were living. She probably would have many more babies, and she did not wish them. How should she? But she was ignorant; she did not know how to escape her fate. Should she and hundreds like her be taught?

Shall she be taught? That is the question we must answer. There are many quite honest people who will answer 'No' without any hesitation; they have been saying 'No' for a very long time; and their predecessors have said 'No' to awkward questions for many hundreds of years. To say 'No' saves trouble and does away with the bother of thinking. It is an attitude quite often the fruit of one of the Seven Deadly Sins.

The attitude of the Church to the question of Birth Control has been this, 'Thou shalt not.' That is the attitude to-day of the Roman, and of a section of the Anglican, Churches, and on what is it based? Upon a tag or two of Scripture; and upon something, for Anglicans vague enough, that is known as 'The Law of the Church.' But you can prove pretty nearly anything you like from Scripture, if you choose your tags cleverly; and

'the Law of the Church' requires critical examination. It is old; in places quite out of date; and, apparently, unalterable, since it cannot be altered except by a Council of the whole Church which seems an unlikely meeting. One may appreciate the point of view of those who rely upon the authority of the Church, but yet ask them, do they realize quite what is implied? In my own time medical practice in this or that direction has been completely inverted: the truths of my student days are the fallacies of to-day again and again in every field of medical 'law.' That law must adapt itself, for the medical profession is a practical one. Must not Church 'law' also change and grow if 'law' be also morality?

Catholicism, which is to-day completely institutionalized Christianity, has developed from older religions and from Paganism. I think of the Pagan as Paganus, the Countryman. Some of Paganism became intellectualized by passing through the Greek filter, and in particular Minoan Paganism; but there is a deal of plain Paganism in Catholicism; and nowhere is this more palpable than in the Church's attitude to Birth Control. The essential idea permeating Pagan religious thought was Fertility. 'Increase and multiply' was, to the Pagan, the supreme divine command. Babies must be had in abundance to provide fighting men and workers; and lambs and calves and grapes and oil and corn for the feeding of them. An earth stubborn under wooden ploughs; unchecked disease and plague; a high rate of infant mortality; these led to the exalting of Fertility as the highest duty and supreme good. To the Pagan, any interference with the steady supply of potential men was to be discouraged. True, Nature might overdo it, when babies were destroyed, but that does not affect my argument. The idea persisted in the Mediaeval Church, when the demand was still for man-power. The Mediaeval Church largely determined the law of the Mediaeval State, and, being exceedingly practical, fulminated against any views or action that might result in the restriction of births. Old ideas linger oddly on. The Report on Birth Control made by the Lambeth Conference of 1930 contains this sentence, 'We now pass on to consider one of the most urgent and perplexing problems of the day, the *decline of the birth-rate throughout the civilized world.*'

The bishops profess themselves 'perplexed' because there are fewer babies. Why? Some bishops at any rate have been parish priests in their time. Some of them, at any rate, must have used their eyes in the meaner streets of our big towns, or in and about the cottages of the countryside. They must have seen babies playing about in the dust, for whom there was no real room. Surely some bishops once did cemetery service, and visited workhouses and hospitals. Why, once congregated at Lambeth, were they perplexed by the falling birthrate? Would the bishops have us return to the birth-rate of thirty years ago, and with it to the infant death-rate of that graveyard of a time, of the modern decline in which death-rate they make no mention in their Report? It is to be presumed they would not, but the Report leaves the matter in doubt. It suggests that the bishops in 1930 regretted the fall in the number of births regardless of the changed world need for population. That sentence in the Report reveals some very muddled thinking. A better impression is made by another passage. 'Other reasons are often urged—circumstances of income, housing and education, are all advanced in justification. These need careful scrutiny. We are unable to accept conception control as the right solution of unsatisfactory social and economic conditions which ought to be changed by the influence of Christian public opinion.' I admit that in a world where there was work for all, food for all, leisure for all, in short, in a properly organized world, our problem would no longer be pressing, would cease to be anything but academic. As things are it is the bishops who are academic. Are we to wait until new conditions are brought about and in the meantime discourage an obvious method of alleviation of pain and suffering in our existing social system? The Report has a high sound, but just exactly what is the influence of Christian public opinion doing for the pressing and, it would seem, permanent problem of the employment of our surplus population? And what is Christian public opinion as an effective force distinct from the opinions of individual Christians, or small groups of Christians, at present lamentably ineffective in getting rid of conditions which make up the tragic paradox of our economic life? To counsel change of economic conditions is excellent, but still counsel of perfection, and a discussion of Birth Control

which presumes that change as the bishops virtually presumed it, is little more than a comfortless exercise in moral theology.

Let us return to the mediaeval Rule of the Church. It has more than one aspect. While in one direction it seems to have encouraged the plentiful supply of babies, it did at the same time continue to set up celibacy as an ideal. It is rather puzzling. The spectacle of a celibate priesthood counselling the raising of large families has aroused a great deal of sometimes ribald mirth. What was at the root of the celibacy ideal? I suggest it was a very low conception of sex. Sex relationships seemed horrifying. With rare exceptions mediaeval men had a rather horrifying view of life at large. I ask one question: Where the mediaeval view of sex still persists, are those who hold it quite normal? The homosexual person is by no means uncommon: and on questions of sex relationships he is a very unreliable guide. Again, is a person whose instincts have been repressed a sound guide? In many cases, I submit, an ecclesiastic talks solemnly, even threateningly, about subjects concerning which he is warped, and his advice is dangerous. From time to time a bishop, or some cleric of more lowly degree, delivers himself of his views concerning women's dress, and his views are too often nasty. There are religious orders in which a member is expected never to look upon even his own body undraped: where the rule is that even in a bath some garment shall be worn. There still survives to-day a very low conception of the human body, an affront to its Designer. It is true that in discussing Birth Control the bishops said something of *pleasure*, but so vaguely and ambiguously that they had better have said nothing. For the issue lies just here.

Are we to adopt the ascetic view of life or are we not? I would say plainly that pleasure in the married state is not only right and moral, but essentially conducive to health and happiness. In my experience its denial is productive of much neurosis, much unhappiness, and much physical suffering. To those who affirm that the physical side of marriage should be merely utilitarian, and suppressed as much as is possible, I reply, 'Look at the results.' One may judge *that* tree by its fruits, to do so is the only relevant judgment of it. But what of illicit sexual pleasure? That is the bogey which is frightening

Christians away from a clear thinking-out of this whole question. The bishops in their report talk about 'The very grave' results of the discovery of effective contraceptive methods. 'They (the methods) have encouraged illicit intercourse among the unmarried by removing the fear of the consequences.' That, no doubt, is true. But is not the statement an admission of failure? It seems an amazing thing for bishops to say. It might as well be said that the only thing that keeps a man from picking and stealing is fear of the policeman and the probability of a month's hard labour. In actual fact, what keeps men straight in any matter is not fear of the consequences of crookedness, but something very different. And the average young man or woman is not deaf to the appeal of that something. In any case, fear of consequences cannot lead to moral conduct, and it is with that the bishops should be concerned. They do not represent the law. It must be granted that restraints to-day are loosened; there is a good deal of moral laxity. There are prophets who preach a very twisted gospel. But no such considerations provide good reason why bishops should oppose the practice of Birth Control. It is their business, rather, to proclaim the *moral* dangers to the individual, and to society, of licence and libertinism. Only the other day I heard a preacher insist that gambling *did not pay*. But the Church is not concerned with the question, does this or that pay, but is this or that right? So with illicit sex relationships. The concern of the Church, I submit, should be, not with the material consequences of a line of conduct, but with the moral standpoint from which the conduct springs.

One objection to Birth Control must be noticed here to be dismissed. It is said to be 'unnatural' to control conception: to be 'an interference with nature.' The single sufficient answer is that in such a sense of the word civilization is 'unnatural,' the arduous achievement of continual 'interferences with nature.' We wear clothes, cook food, travel by mechanical means; and we spend many years from infancy onwards learning to control natural instincts and to acquire unnatural habits. What is this 'nature'? To plead it against Birth Control is thoughtless. As a doctor, and I could speak for numbers of my profession, I consider Birth Control physically safe; and I be-

lieve it to be moral; when used within reasonable bounds. It is as 'natural,' then, as monogamy. When I am consulted I advocate the bringing of children into the world at intervals which appear sound. The life of a woman who spends twenty or thirty years always pregnant, or just getting over pregnancy, is purgatory; and when she exists in grinding poverty, is hell. If such a life be natural, then we must escape from nature. On the other hand I consider the deliberately childless marriage a disaster. Opponents of Birth Control usually pretend to regard that disaster as the alternative to unregulated conception and continual child-bearing. They say it is impossible to provide a rule of life which shall insure against both over-indulgence in sexual pleasure and childlessness. It is a manufactured difficulty hardly worth the answering. Obviously there can be no fixed rule for the direction of married people; but a reasonable morality, which gladly accepts the fact of sex and the facts of personality and of love, will do what no rule can.

Christianity is nothing if it is not social in the finest sense. 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.' My quarrel with those who proclaim what they call 'The New Morality' is that their doctrines and practices are so essentially selfish. Certainly Christianity can make no terms with selfishness. It cannot agree that a so-called self-expression can be right if it results in conduct which arrives solely at self-gratification. We have not the right, sexually or otherwise, to do as we please irrespective of consequences to ourselves, to another, and to the community. It is true there are people who say that Christian sex-morality is in a manner artificial: that what we call irregularities were usual in the Old World, when many quite pious people took them as a matter of course. But the conditions of the Old World were not those of the New. And it is, supremely, Christianity which has made the difference; it was intended to make a difference: it has gone on making a difference. If we wish to preserve what is best in the New World, if we would better that World, we must contend for the continuance and willing acceptance of Christian morality. But, and on this above all I would insist, Christian morality is not ecclesiastical rule, nor any kind of rule. There is a place for rule; but the inspiration of a Christian's life is other and greater than rule.

I have appeared in antagonism to the Church, but that is not the last impression I would leave on the reader. I recognize the Church's difficulties, and in particular that the English Church, consisting of many Christian individuals of many views, cannot, by her nature, speak with one authoritative voice on this question. And if I may venture the remark, the Church of England, as I see it, is becoming every day more dynamic. It is attempting to face realities, and refuses to be trammelled by tradition which, however attractive as a finished system, hinders rather than helps men in direct contact with the problems which are giving us such acute anxiety to-day. It is to that English Church, content to preach plain Christianity to a modern world, that we must look in hope for the future.

BOOK REVIEWS

A MODERN PROJECT FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF RELIGION*

Jonathan Swift, whose abilities and services secured the tardy reward of banishment to an Irish deanery, believed that his aspirations to the episcopal bench had been frustrated by the offence given to Queen Anne by his *Tale of a Tub,* and particularly by his ill-repute in the eyes of the royal confessor, John Sharp, Archbishop of York. Mr. Hardwick's recent tractate suggests that he has drunk deeply of Swift : its style, an occasional phrase, and especially its pervading tone, indicate a close correspondence with the Swiftian model ; and the result is an exceedingly spirited and entertaining essay. In consequence it may be assumed that the Vicar of Partington has abandoned hopes of capitular or decanal, not to say episcopal, preferment : for if his reputation for orthodoxy survived the publication of *A Professional Christian,* the appearance of *A Letter to an Archbishop* will leave but a few shreds wherewith to clothe the nakedness of the author. It may be conjectured, indeed, that the successor of Archbishop Sharp in the northern primacy may conceive as ill an opinion of Mr. Hardwick as did that prelate of the writer of a former *Project for the Advancement of Religion:* for, although the identity of the metropolitan addressed in this letter is concealed, His Grace of York is mentioned not obscurely nor infrequently in the text. By apostolic precept we are enjoined to avoid speaking evil of dignities : and it may therefore be proper to pass over the occasional lapses wherein this injunction is transgressed.

The substance of Mr. Hardwick's pamphlet is an attack upon the cult of organisation and machinery in the contemporary Church to the exclusion of the intellectual duty of re-presenting the Christian faith in terms of modern thought.

* *A Letter to an Archbishop.* By J. C. Hardwick. (The Hogarth Press Letters, No. 10 : 1932. 1/-.)

In the first part of his *Letter,* he draws a penetrating picture of the social forces which have changed the position of the Church alike in local and national life. Within his own lifetime the advent of a State system of secondary education, and of the State provision for sickness and unemployment benefits for the majority of manual workers, has changed the social conditions of the people, whilst the popularity of the cinema and of the cheap motor-car has affected powerfully the intellectual outlook of the majority of the population. With this new mobility and the widening of horizons of life, the traditional immobile parochial system of the Church has broken down; and Mr. Hardwick makes congenial (and very amusing) fun of the cult of machinery and activity associated with the career of Bishop Samuel Wilberforce and with the Victorian belief in mechanical progress. The matter, indeed, is serious: for the attempt to build new churches and parochial halls for a population addicted to the week-end habit of exploring the countryside in small touring cars fails to touch the essentials of the problem of recovering the allegiance of the middle-class population. The heart of the question is asserted by Mr. Hardwick to lie in the failure of the Church to meet the intellectual and moral challenge of the modern scientific materialism alike in thought and practice. Herein he has some true, and many pungent, observations to make upon the Modernist controversy which troubled the waters in the year of the outbreak of the Great War, and upon the reaction therefrom during the War, in which the clergy threw themselves into various forms of social and patriotic activity as a means of escape from the grave moral and intellectual problems which were forced upon the consideration of ordinary citizens by the unprecedented devastation and inhumanity of the world-conflict.

It is of the essence of satire to emphasise one side of the picture, and Mr. Hardwick does less than justice to the noteworthy attempts of Anglican theologians to confront the contemporary problems of faith and morals. It may indeed be doubted whether the *general* standard of clerical education has been higher in any previous century of the Church of England than in the present. Recollections of the unordained Readers of the Elizabethan age, and of the quasi-perpetual deacons of the Caroline and Georgian centuries, suggest a not unflattering comparison from the standpoint of the contemporary Church.

The novel factor of the present generation is the astonishingly rapid rise in the general standard of popular education, and herein the difference between the education of the parish clergy and that of their congregations is probably less than in any previous period. Mr. Hardwick insists rightly upon the need for raising the standard of clerical education, which has admittedly declined since the conclusion of the War, and upon the necessity for the Church to confront the challenge to traditional religion both in its abstract and practical aspects.

But it is perhaps unfair to subject Mr. Hardwick to the prosaic criticisms of the pedant. Peradventure he has written in the spirit no less than after the pattern of Swift, so that, just as Swift's famous pamphlet on *The Conduct of the Allies* should be read less for any information it affords concerning the actual conduct of the Grand Alliance than for insight into the political ideas of its author, so *A Letter to an Archbishop* may be perused less for its counsel to primatial rulers than for its revaluation of the contents of Mr. Hardwick's mind. Thus conceived it is as good a reproduction of Swift as the modern age may permit: and the reader will divest himself of the responsibility of critic. Further, for the consolation alike of the author and the archbishop, it may be remembered that the Dean of St.

Patrick's wrote also a treatise upon the disadvantages probably ensuing from the supposed project for abolishing Christianity! Doubtless a perusal thereof will induce Mr. Hardwick to bend his pen to the defence of religion as established amongst us: in the expectation of which our bishops and clergy may sleep at ease in Zion, confiding in the zeal of the Vicar of Partington not only to admonish them of impending danger, but to lend the support of his invincible efforts to defeat the conspiracy of materialists, rationalists and atheists to encompass its downfall.

J.E.D.P.

AN IDEALIST VIEW OF LIFE*

This volume contains the Hibbert Lectures delivered in the University of Manchester in December, 1929, and in the University College, London in January, 1930. 'They endeavour to restate a point of view which is nothing new but constitutes the very essence of the great philosophic tradition of idealism' (p. 13). They retain the informal and occasionally conversational style and do not claim to follow out the full implications of the problem in detail. The restatement is required as a possible solution for present difficulties in traditional religion. The present chaos is described and attributed ultimately to an undue reliance upon the results of inadequate modes of knowing. The inevitable imperfections of knowledge gained by imperfect response to Reality is to be corrected, it is claimed, by religious intuition which is the culmination of all knowledge. The final chapters are designed 'to show that the general character of the universe as known is quite consistent with the intuited certainty of God' (p. 221).

The modern challenge to religion is caused 'as much by the moral ineffectiveness of religion, its failure to promote the best life, as by the insistent pressure of new knowledge on traditional beliefs' (p. 49). The most disintegrating power has been the spirit, methods, and achievements of science. Particular dogmas and religious dogmatism must be neglected. But modern substitutes for religion fail to satisfy 'the primal craving for the eternal and the abiding' (p. 82). These modern substitutes include Naturalistic Atheism, Agnosticism, Scepticism, Humanism and rather strangely, Modernism. The sketch of Modernism is very brief and it is by no means clear why the author should appear so unsympathetic towards a movement in several respects so much in line with his own contentions.

All these substitutes lack the personal experience of God which is the essence of religion. Not to know religious experience is not to know religion. This experience is more than mere consciousness of value.

> 'It is the reaction of the whole man to the whole reality. We seek the religious object by the totality of our faculties and energies. Such functioning of the whole man may be called spiritual life, as distinct from a merely intellectual or moral or aesthetic activity or a combination of them' (p. 88). 'Here we find the essence of religion, which is a synthetic realisation of life. The religious man has the knowledge that everything is significant, the feeling that there is harmony underneath the conflicts and the power to realise the significance and harmony' (p. 201).

The illumination of new knowledge or the ecstasy of poetry are glimpses of the nature of religious experience. The profound religious intuition is its own authority. The religious genius 'claims for his knowledge of reality

**An Idealist View of Life.* By S. Radhakrishnan. The Hibbert Lectures for 1929. George Allen and Unwin. 12/6.)

an immediate and intuitive certainty, transcending any which mere reason can reach. No further experience or rational criticism can disturb his sense of certainty. Doubt and disbelief are no more possible.' Words cannot communicate experience but words may express the 'affirmations' of religious experience. There are two basic affirmations. 'There is a mode of consciousness which is distinct from the perceptual, imaginative or intellectual, and this carries with it self-evidence and completeness,' and 'The larger environment is of the nature of one's own self, with which the individual occasionally comes into contact.' In short the human mind seeks an underlying harmony in the universe. 'For the intellect the unity is only a postulate, an act of faith. For the spirit the harmony is the experienced reality.'

As the Western mind with its trust in critical intelligence is naturally distrustful of a mode of knowledge which by its nature cannot be expressed in propositions, two important chapters are devoted to a defence of creative intuition as the highest form of knowledge. Sense experience yields the character of the external world. Discursive thought, though of practical utility, is but a poor substitute for direct acquaintance. 'He who speaks about sleep and discusses its nature and conditions knows all about sleep except sleep itself.' Moreover, concentrated thought cannot mediate the life of feeling and emotion. Intuitive knowing is direct acquaintance. 'This intuitive knowledge arises from an intimate fusion of mind with reality. It is knowledge by being and not by senses or symbols. It is awareness of the truth of things by identity.' We cannot dispense with intuition even if we would. 'The deepest convictions by which we live and think, are not derived from perceptual experience or logical knowledge.' All our experience is ultimately grounded on intuitions which we accept but do not prove. To deny intuition requires what is ultimately an intuited ground of denial. By a rejection of intuitive knowledge 'we slide into infinite regress and we can escape it only by assuming knowledge which is valid in itself.' We cannot think without faith in thought and we cannot seek a rational interpretation of experience without faith that experience is ultimately rational. It is less easy to admit that 'From the point of view of empirical understanding it is a mere hypothesis that the realms of nature and spirit, existence and value, are not alien; but for intuition it is a fact' (p. 155). The great philosophers all admit basic intuitions which are not attained by argument. Not only the foundations but the highest achievements of creative work in science and philosophy, in art and life, are the outcome of intuitive experience. 'A new law in mathematics is just as much a bit of spontaneous intuition as is a composition in music by Mozart' (p. 176).

It appears, therefore, that religious intuition is the supreme instance of a capacity which is utilised in all stages of our knowledge. The intuitions of truth, beauty and goodness conclude in a sublime intuition of God. 'From the eternal values we pass to a supporting mind in which they dwell.' Creative intuition is a response of the integrated personality. It is not blind instinct, nor fanciful imagination, nor indisciplined impulses of the unconscious mind or discursive reasoning, but 'the wisdom gained by the whole spirit which is above any mere fragment thereof, be it feeling or intellect' (p. 147). In brief, religious faith emerges from the total nature of man. 'It is not something uncanny, confined to children, narratives and savages.'

But religious intuition is not to be accepted unless it may be reconciled with the scientific account of the universe. In a stimulating chapter on 'Matter, Life and Mind' an illuminating outline is given of the modern

scientific views of the universe with a keen appreciation of the limitations of scientific knowledge and a justified reserve in accepting the hasty conclusions of scientists on the philosophic problems of substance, cause, human freedom, life and mind. The examination of the scientific view of the physical world is followed by a review of the personal world. The self is a teleological unity. Perfection is reached not after one human life but after a series of rebirths. The whole process is governed by 'Karma' which properly understood does not exclude freedom. The ultimate condition is a spiritual universalism. A final chapter suggests that 'While the Absolute is pure consciousness and pure freedom and infinite possibility, it appears to be God from the point of view of the one specific possibility which has become actualised' (p. 344).

The argument from religious experience suffers certain inevitable limitations in discussion because it is a statement rather than an argument. Those who enjoy mystic intuitions require no other proof and those who can claim no such sublime experience cannot be enlightened by its conceptual description. The argument often causes, therefore, a certain exasperation on both sides. Many who would freely admit that their private intuitions of truth, beauty and goodness, admit no further proof; and that in seeking rationality in experience we assume a rationality which remains to be proved; and that progress in knowledge is by spasmodic intuitions; and that theism is not incompatible with science, would doubt whether these are in all cases the same types of intuition. In any case, even if these intuitions do form a genuine hierarchy, they are no substitutes for the supreme experience. Those who lack this experience find a more congenial study in the works of Dr. Tennant. But this volume provides a refreshing and at times inspiring presentation of an argument which, by its very nature, cannot make as universal an appeal as arguments which require less special gifts in their followers.

G. F. Woods.

BERENGAR*

When Dr. Macdonald wrote this book he had already won a reputation for scholarship in the study of the early Middle Ages by his *Lanfranc, his life, work and writing*. This study of Berengar and his thought enhances that reputation. In his Preface the author declares himself ready to show that the Berengarian type of Eucharistic doctrine is found constantly in Christian thought from New Testament times, and survived the condemnation of Berengar by the Church, so that 'the Evangelical interpretation of Eucharistic doctrine, put forth by the Reformed Churches, does not merely issue from Reformation times — but has a long and honourable history.' He proves this thesis, but only incidentally, his book being not polemic but one proper for students, in which not only is Berengar allowed always to speak for himself but so also are his numerous and bitter opponents. In fact we are shown that Berengar's chief influence was in forcing opponents to clarify or amend doctrines that were to be formulated as Transubstantiation in 1215. In criticism, the book, even for a student, is overburdened in its historical part with facts of minor importance not always strictly relevant; while a newcomer to this subject and period would surely have found much help in a concise abstraction of Berengar's final Eucharistic position as a guide to the maze of writings, complicated by enforced recantations, by which the Scolasticus developed and propounded it. On the other hand,

* *Berengar and the Reform of Sacramental Doctrine*. A. J. Macdonald, D.D. (Longmans and Co.: 1930. Price 21/-.)

this book in its careful documentation, cleared out of the text into footnotes, and scrupulous acknowledgments to other writers, quoted wherever possible, is a model for its kind. The book is divided into two quite separate parts: historical and doctrinal.

Berengar was born just after 1000, in all probability at Tours (p. 5). Educated at the school at Chartres, he became a teacher at the Cathedral School of St. Martin's, at Tours, some time after 1028, of which eventually he became Scholasticus or Rector; was Archdeacon of Angers by 1040; and returned to Tours at the close of a life of vicissitudes to rest, and to die in 1088. The school at Chartres under Fulbert was in advance of its times, laying stress not only on the normal study of grammar but also on dialectic and logic and relying upon the use of reason to a degree considered heretical. Thus dialectic was used for an understanding of the Scriptures and the Fathers — and Berengar in turn taught that the Scriptures must be read in the light of reason, not allegorically, and without presuppositions. 'For example,' he writes, '"Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them." If this be carelessly read it may be concluded that the Lord will seem to say that you may do unto others any evil that you are willing they should do unto you.' Again, '"He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved" must be read: "He that believeth so that he performs what he believes."' It was the use of his literary sense on the Gospel stories of the Last Supper and on the Canon, as much as his application of logic to Eucharistic doctrine, that put him in conflict with the Church. His most redoubtable opponent was Lanfranc; the majority were clerical barbarians who on more than one occasion used physical violence against him and his young followers, or politicians of the contemporary Church-States who used him and the other disputants as pawns. But Dr. Macdonald shows clearly that if it was the politicians who helped to stage the first condemnation by Leo IX at Rome in 1050, it was the religious who lent zest to the ugly proceedings and kept up persecution for thirty years. The story of how Gregory VII secretly befriended and advised Berengar until Berengar, under stress of a public prosecution, pleaded the authority of the Pope, when Gregory at once 'like a bolt' turned against him, is an exciting and pitiful one:

> 'What shall I say?' cries poor Berengar, 'disturbed by the sudden madness of the Pope, and lest he should pronounce the anathema upon me, and the mob should seize me for the death it desired of me, I flung myself down and confessed that I had erred' (p. 193).

He read aloud an affirmation clean contrary to his opinion. That was the last great battle, in 1079, the Council of Rome, and it had gone against Berengar. Yet Dr. Macdonald's tribute is just. 'In his own day Berengar was a defeated man, but no career illustrates more completely the wisdom of never admitting defeat,' and his contribution to the invincible world of thought was made under condemnations and detentions multiplied from 1050 on, and in the teeth of the ecclesiastical authorities and the scholars recognised in his day.

Dr. Macdonald gives nearly two hundred pages to an examination of Berengar's doctrines, which are most fully set out in the *De Sacra Coena*, tracing plainly, with many references, their origins and growth and their effect on contemporary orthodoxy. The popular view hung on a materialistic literalness of interpretation of the Words of Institution as crass as the Church has ever officially countenanced. The recantation Berengar was forced, on threat of death, to make at Rome in 1059 is dreadful reading:

> 'I, Berengar, the unworthy deacon of the Church of St. Maurice, Angers, perceiving the true Catholic and Apostolic Faith, (affirm that) —the bread and wine which are placed on the altar, after consecration are not only a sacrament, but the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and perceptibly not only in the Sacrament, but in reality, are touched and broken by the hands of the priest and ground by the teeth of the faithful.'

The scholarly view acceptable to the Church is best seen in Lanfranc's *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini* written in reply to Berengar's 'Opusculum.' Basing his thought on Paschasius Radbert, who had hardened in a literal and materialistic mould the ambiguous teaching of Ambrose, Lanfranc, with Radbert certainly and Ambrose doubtfully, denied that the material elements remained on the altar after consecration and first enunciated a theory of Transubstantiation. Berengar attacked both the popular and the official scholarly views by logical examination, by reference to common sense, and, be it said, with vituperation.

> 'Reason compels an admission that it is contrary to the law of nature that one thing can be changed into another without the breaking up or annihilation of its original elements . . . a breaking up of one substance takes place before the other can come into existence. The latter does not exist before the former has ceased to exist. Supposing it were possible for the bread on the altar to be transformed materially, through a breaking up of itself, into the flesh of the Lord, then a change would have taken place into a substance which before that moment did not exist. But that is impossible, since the flesh of Christ has existed for ages in immortality in a state of perfection' (pp. 256, 257).

Further, the bread and wine remained after consecration for Berengar's stout common sense; they looked and tasted as bread and wine. The change, then, must be *spiritualiter*, and Berengar goes on in his positive teaching to distinguish between the 'thing' of the sacrament and the 'symbol.' The 'thing' is the internal grace, received in the mind; the 'symbols' are the consecrated elements, which are not Christ present in his historical body (*sensualiter*) on the altar, but signs, for the worshipper's mind, of his spiritual presence. Yet we consider it would be rash to say that Berengar, in a day when Nominalism was young, maintained that consecration worked no change of any kind in the elements. It was the alleged mode of the miracle, rather than the miracle itself, to which he objected. He had no difficulty in accepting the report of the change of Lot's wife into a pillar of salt, since presumably the substance of the lady broke up and was annihilated to make way for the salt, which did not afterwards look like a lady. He regarded the eucharistic change as effective, the elements consecrated working spiritually upon the worshipper, but we doubt if he thought, except, perhaps, we exclusively infer so from his extremest and clearest utterances, that the only change was the change in the significance given to the elements by the worshipper. The act of consecration was to him an essential and the central act in the Communion Service. Dr. Macdonald himself regards the Berengarian doctrine not as symbolism, but as 'dynamic symbolism,' and our only serious disagreement with our author is over his suggestion that the Church of England might profitably find 'a foundation upon which to create a new interpretation of Eucharistic symbolism centring round the Berengarian conception of religious value and effect — the dynamic influence of the consecrated symbol upon the believing communicant.' In practice so sophisticated a view would not work; there would cease to be 'the believing communicant'; just as the popular modern view that prayer is effective through

the setting up of an appropriate psychological condition does not work, unless 'prayer' be abandoned and content be had with auto-suggestion. When we perceive that a thing we thought to be of supernatural effect upon us is really of self-made psychological effect, it begins to cease to have effect and only recovers power, and then a different power, when we are ready to accept and deliberately to use it and the process by which in fact it works. But it is difficult to imagine a worshipper concentrating upon the act of consecration and the elements as deliberately selected foci for auto-suggestion. In the alternative both Berengar and Dr. Macdonald, within their terms of reference, which concern the consecrated elements, as of peculiar import, rather than the service as a whole, must postulate some significance, lent from outside ourselves, to the consecrating act and so *some* change in the elements; and that postulate, in our opinion, is not ultimately compatible with a religion at once wholly rational and spiritual and truly mysterious, and in which the elements, consecrated or unconsecrated, can be but incidentals in an act of worship.

Dr. Macdonald successfully establishes his thesis that Berengar found in tradition the doctrine he developed, and the examination of the teachings of John the Scot and of Augustine, most suggestive for the student, many will consider the most fascinating part of this book. Every thoughtful clergyman will find this book valuable in his urgent task of making and clarifying modern teaching about the service of Holy Communion.

M.T.D.

HISTORICAL *v.* SPECULATIVE CHRISTIANITY*

The student of early Church History cannot fail to be impressed by the apparent discontinuity between the Catholic Church as it emerged from the formative second century, and primitive Christianity as we see it in the New Testament. That the dark tunnel through which Christianity passed has not yet been adequately explored is evidenced by the eccentricity of the theories which some scholars continue to propound. Of these theories not the least strange is that which sees in Mandaeanism evidence of the existence of a primitive sect which took John the Baptist as its hero instead of Jesus Christ. It is even urged that the Fourth Gospel is the Gospel of this hypothetical sect revised and rewritten in the interests of Christian orthodoxy.

In his Morse Lectures* Professor Burkitt examines this theory and pronounces it to be false and without any foundation. Mandaeanism is in large part Gnosticism run to seed. It is not true that it is hostile to Jesus Christ. It is bitterly hostile to the Christ of post-Nicene theology, 'the Byzantine Christ,' but the Manichaean Jesus it accepts. In other words the Mandaeans were in fact and in origin Christian Dissenters. In the course of his lectures Professor Burkitt considers the general meaning and tendency of Gnosticism and its relationship to orthodox Christianity. He comes to the conclusion that the great Gnostic thinkers were primarily Christians, heretics indeed, but heretics 'not in the sense that they left the high road, but in the sense that the track along which they went was not the direction along which the high road was afterwards constructed.'

What Professor Burkitt calls the main stock-in-trade with which Gentile Christianity started consisted in the expectation of the Second Coming of Christ and an authoritative book, the Old Testament. The Gnostics attempted to get rid of the eschatological element, which in truth with the lapse of time must have been embarrassing, by substituting for it the Greek

* *Church and Gnosis.* By F. C. Burkitt, D.D. (Published Cambridge University Press. Price 6/-.)

belief in the natural immortality of the imprisoned human soul, while at the same time they strove to free Christianity from its Jewish element. The result, however grotesque it may seem to us, was in conformity with current cosmogony and philosophy. Unfortunately, however, as Professor Burkitt points out, 'the science of that time was crude and the philosophy too greatly belittled the things of sense, so that the Gnostic "new theology" was unsatisfactory.' If Gnosticism had had its way Christianity would have ceased to be a historical and would have become a speculative religion. 'The Gnostics,' says Professor Burkitt, 'did not like the annalistic; they wanted the systematic, something not conditioned by time and environment.'

It is significant that the New Testament is as annalistic and unsystematic as the Old Testament. 'What,' asks Professor Burkitt, 'should we think of, say, one of the "Sacred Books of the East," six per cent of which proved on examination to consist of the detailed story of a shipwreck?' And the writer of *Acts* was one of the four Evangelists on whom we rely for the only accounts of Jesus Christ we possess. 'Both Mark and Luke appear to be historical in intention: they wish to tell their readers a tale which they believe to be true.' The publication of Mark's Gospel about 65 or 66 A.D. Professor Burkitt describes as epoch-making.

> 'What Mark did, as I understand the matter, was to turn the Evangel into a Biography. He has the merits and the faults of a pioneer. It was a discovery to find that by merely telling the tale of the career of Jesus those who heard it said with the Centurion "Truly this man was a Son of God!" Mark compiled his tale from reminiscences of Peter and (for the last week) from reminiscences of his own. Others of Mark's acquaintance had no doubt contributed their share. Some things in the result are surely not quite historical. But so much is real reminiscence that the general outline is not far from real history.'

Professor Burkitt considers the methods of Form-Criticism, the latest critical vogue, to be unsound and without an adequate basis. The presupposition of this type of criticism is that, before they were collected, tales about Jesus were widely circulated. There is no evidence for this assumption, and the fact that, apart from Mark's Gospel, there is little trace of such tales, is strong evidence to the contrary. What 'the Rt. Hon. Theophilus and his contemporaries had been taught would seem to have been, not tales about Jesus, but something of the nature of the first principles enumerated in Hebrews vi, 1, 2.' There is no evidence that 'he, or any of his contemporaries, had heard of Capernaum or Bethsaida or of what had happened there.'

In spite of the didactic and theological colouring of the First and Fourth Gospels they so far conformed to the Marcan norm that they also are quite definitely annalistic. The Johannine Logos, Professor Burkitt considers, is to be linked with the Word of the first chapter of Genesis rather than with the Philonic Logos.

> 'What the Evangelist introduces us to is no new theology, but the familiar though lofty conception of Genesis, *viz.* that of the One only God producing the creation by consulting with Himself, yet bringing forth into visible form nothing without announcing His formulated intention.'

In Genesis the first Word is 'Let there be light.' In the Gospel John the Baptist witnesses to the Light then and there coming into the world, the

ground of his witness being his vision of the Spirit of God descending on Jesus. If this is a true interpretation the Johannine Christology is definitely adoptionist.

> 'As I understand the tale told in the first chapter of John, what is taught in that chapter is that the creative word of God, which had of old produced light and energy out of nothing, descended upon the man Jesus and remained upon him; John actually witnessed this event and had been inspired to know its meaning. The fourth Gospel does not say that John baptized Jesus, but that he witnessed the descent of the Spirit of God: that descent, as I understand the text, *was* the Incarnation . . . This is not orthodox Christology, but it does seem to me to be Johannine Christology.'

Professor Burkitt makes the reader well aware that the subjects with which he deals, recondite and remote though some of them be, are of more than antiquarian interest. The issues which he discusses are living issues. The effort which the Gnostics made to express Christianity in terms of current thought we also must needs make. But their extravagances may serve to remind us that there is such a thing as what Francis Bacon calls *intellectus sibi permissus,* or, as it has been translated, 'reason run amuck.' The Church was right in refusing to allow Christianity to be divorced from history. It was wise on insisting on keeping its feet firmly planted on the ground of actuality in face of the allurement of mystical Schwärmerei and soaring speculation.

G. L. H. Harvey.

CROCKFORD'S, 1933*

Crockford's shares with almanacks and calendars a power of evoking regret. 'Time, like an ever-rolling stream, bears all its sons away.' There are few so disinterested in their fellows as not to know at all the temptation to idle with the pages of a new volume. Modern Churchmen who do so will note the disappearance of at least one name revered by them. Canon R. B. Tollinton, D.D., Chairman of the Governors of Ripon Hall, died on Sunday, October 23rd, 1932.

Crockford's of this year shares one other quality with an almanack; the style of many passages is like *Mr. Punch,* in his annual review of national events, and at his best:

> 'But a good many years have passed since Lord Westbury (better known, perhaps, as Sir Richard Bethell) was compelled by public opinion to resign his custody of the Great Seal for a "job" so mild that almost any one of his predecessors would have been regarded as lacking in that natural affection which must be counted as one of the finest feelings of our common humanity if he had failed to do a great deal more for the needier members of his family.'

An urbanity which comes of a philosopher's view of the world.

> 'A discussion (in the House of Clergy) of the report on *Christian Giving* afforded several speakers an opportunity for the expression of many admirable sentiments which owed more to the exquisite art of the orator than to any intrinsic freshness or novelty.'

We believe the Editor to have coined a new and splendid word. Writing of the success of Holy Trinity Church, Cape Town, in resisting, through the Courts, the claim of the Archbishop of Cape Town to be its trustee, the Editor says:

* *Crockford's Clerical Directory for 1933.* (Oxford University Press. Price two guineas; India paper, three guineas.)

'The victory may prove to be of a somewhat Pyrrhic, or even *denasalizing*, character as it appears to reduce Holy Trinity Church to something resembling a spiritual St. Kilda. (We believe that the inhabitants of St. Kilda have now come to consist of a colony of wrens of a species unknown elsewhere.)'

The Editor is also to be congratulated upon a new definition. 'This phrase (Educational Expert) has come into use of recent years to denote those who make it their business to talk about education without actually endeavouring to impart it.' Congratulated, too, for his clear exposition of the Church Assembly's *Benefices (Purchase of Rights of Patronage) Measure*. He is probably right in thinking it will be little employed since Church Councils do not object 'perhaps as strongly as they ought' to Party Trusts, nor are likely to relish themselves purchasing an advowson that it may be held by their diocesan Patronage Board. The Preface includes an excellent summary by a correspondent of the present difficulties of tithe-holders, in which alarmist fears are allayed and advice offered which is both sage and fair-minded. Room is found for an acute and sober discursion on Armaments, and for some plain sense about Ecclesiastical Courts, that leave no doubt that the anonymity of the Editor should be preserved. Prominence should be given to one Editorial dictum. 'The clergy will be well advised to keep a careful look-out for attempts which may be made, upon any pretext whatsoever, to prevent them from bringing their cause before one of His Majesty's Judges.' And in a Church filled, since the rejection of the Prayer Book Measure and for its dead sake, with bleatings of peace where clearly there is making ready for war it is embraving to hear one trumpet-call :

> 'So long as the Roman Church declares that it is co-terminous with the Catholic Church, that no Ministry or Sacraments save its own are valid or operative so that all who are outside it stand in jeopardy every hour, and so long as there are those who are liable to be impressed by such assertions, it is important that the arguments on which they rest, and which can be urged against them, should be widely known and readily accessible.'

Concerning the supply of clergy the Editor unkindly disturbs the complacent dreaming and the dream-talk in which some who could know better have publicly indulged during the past twelve months. If certain dioceses are getting as many men as they can absorb, it is 'because of the difficulty of providing the necessary stipends.' In 1869 'there were about five thousand assistant-curates at work in the two provinces. The number is hardly, if at all, larger to-day. But the population has doubled . . . The day on which the Church can afford to pay for more than about two-thirds of the men it needs does not seem to be yet in sight.'

The Preface is in fact a clear if disillusioning review of the work of the English Church in 1932. All the more pity, then, that in two instances it errs in knowledge, judgment and taste. It seems a comic and wilful misrepresentation of many devoted and enlightened workers well aware of their difficulties, though a misrepresentation that may prove, we fear, too readily acceptable to some clergy, to pronounce it 'hardly too much to say' that there is no interest in elementary education 'outside the foundation-managers of non-provided schools.' More, even if the Editor be justified, for reasons quite unknown to us, in assuming that the teacher's sense of vocation varies inversely as his preoccupation with questions of pay and *status*, might he not have reminded his readers, influential as they are in the forming of

public opinion, that a young elementary school-teacher, with incumbent upon him the maintenance of a certain standard of life and learning, begins his career, since the ten per cent. cut in his salary, on pay considerably less than a Police Constable receives, and must find it hard to be occupied with anything else save money and a bravely-kept appearance? And, in a Christian community, or, more practically, by the light of the Scandinavian countries and of Scotland to a degree, why should it be thought so wrong-headed 'to transform "the educational ladder" into the equivalent of a social escalator?' Again, the discussion of clerical incomes and clerical marriages, which is chiefly concerned with the younger clergy, gives evidence in the vague generalisations, concisely enough stated, of that muddled thinking on the subject too popular to-day with Church authorities, doubtless because it provides the comfort of a narcotic. The Editor rightly doubts 'whether the Church as a whole has begun to envisage the real outcome of the social change which has come over the Ministry' but fails to add that the disappearance of private incomes is not a phenomenon peculiarly found among the clergy. It does not disturb, though it certainly inconveniences, most of the assistant clergy as much as it appears to disturb their elders. The younger generation, clerical and lay, is not that much enamoured of either the Church or the State which the age of rapidly-made private incomes has bequeathed to it. The fact is, the change in our whole social life is now well under way and it were best to recognise it. The decision which actually lies before the Church, in the use of all her moneys, is between a priesthood, without wife or education, trained only to the manual and vocal tasks of administering the sacraments and provided, perhaps in religious houses, with the necessities of the simplest life; and a clergy who by right of character and knowledge will naturally assume moral leadership in a community whose best activities and loves they share. It is poor taste, and worse, to admit that an adequately salaried ministry 'theoretically may be the more excellent way' and to follow with the implication of the suggestion that the majority of the younger clergy should recognize 'the new demands' made upon them by 'their elevation to another sphere.' In both these passages —and both about money—there is declension from the more excellent style of the rest, and, rather, they reflect the uneasy superiority of the *bourgeoisie* of the suburbs of any Northern industrial town who see vanishing about them the conditions of their brief ascendancy since the factories in all things unessential.

Clergy young or old, if unable to afford the necessary luxury of a new Crockford, should make a point of reading on their first opportunity the informative and entertaining Preface which launches this volume.

M.T.D.

RELIGION IN SOUTH AMERICA*

Every schoolboy knows that in 1493 the Pope divided the New World between Spain and Portugal; but the consequences of that grant of absolute spiritual authority and the missionary zeal with which the Catholic Monarchs pursued it have been much less widely studied. 'The Other Spanish Christ' is an important contribution to our knowledge of South America, as well as being an interesting study of the characteristics of Spanish Catholicism. Dr. Mackay has made the religious problem of South America the preoccupation of his life and so has unique qualifications for writing on this subject.

* *The Other Spanish Christ.* By J. A. Mackay, D.Litt. 288 pages. (S.C.M.: 1932. Price 9/-.)

His book is divided into three parts. The first of these discusses some general characteristics of the Iberian race and then the expression of these in the colonisation of South America. Dr. Mackay shows how an intense individualism, which produced full-blooded men possessed with an insatiable acquisitiveness, was blended with an instinct for Catholicity; while colour was given to both by that predominance of passion which leads men to act on impulse rather than logic. Hence, in Spain's greatest age, she became religiously intoxicated with the sense of a mission. She was 'the arm of the Lord' to establish His righteousness over the earth, and 'for the first and last time in the history of Christendom did the sword and the cross form an offensive alliance to carry Christianity, or what was considered to be Christianity, to other lands.'

The result was that the religion which these crusaders brought to South America was still-born. Its institutional side was complete, but its soul was lacking. Christ was presented as a fetish and His religion was cut loose from morality, while the un-Christian acts of cruelty and treachery on the part of the invaders made their mission an amazing mockery. 'Are there any Christians in heaven?' asked one Indian chief on being condemned to be burnt alive, but exhorted by his confessor to become converted and so go to heaven. 'Why, of course,' was the reply. 'Well, I don't want to go to any place where I shall have any chance of meeting them.' No one can read these pages without being deeply moved by this shameful betrayal of the name of Christ.

The second part is called a Philosophy of Spanish Catholicism. It explains what the author had in mind when he coined the title of this book. The Christ who became naturalised in South America is a dehumanised Christ. 'He appears almost exclusively in two dramatic rôles — the rôle of the infant in his mother's arms, and the rôle of a suffering and bleeding victim. *It is the picture of a Christ who was born and died but who never lived*' (p. 110). Hence the inspiration of His life and the significance of His command, 'Follow me,' have been lost — though the attempt was made to restore them in the fetish worship of the Sacred Heart and similar cults. But there is another Christ who has spoken through the prophets and mystics of Spanish history, 'the only Christ in the spiritual history of the Iberian race.' Dr. Mackay traces the influence of some who have portrayed this Christ from Raymond Lull in the thirteenth century to some of the outstanding personalities of modern times.

The book closes with a survey of some new spiritual currents in modern South America. It includes an informative sketch of a group of very different thinkers and workers and a brief but penetrating study of the advent and progress of Protestantism. The author recognises the enormous difficulties with which this movement is confronted, and he discusses some of the criticisms which have been levelled against it. But he is confident that the other Spanish Christ will win the day, and he writes hopefully and inspiringly. Certainly, we had no idea that Protestantism was already so widespread in South America as his statistics suggest.

Dr. Mackay does his best to be fair, but the subject is one on which it is almost impossible to be unprejudiced. We wish he had avoided the unnecessarily frequent descriptions of Catholicism as 'a Coalman's faith' and 'graveyard ideal of a religious life.' But it is the book of a man on fire with a passion for Christ and for a spiritual religion. It deserves to be read widely.

J. P. Hodges.

CORRESPONDENCE

DR. CHARLES' PREACHING.

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman.*

SIR,

There is an attractive memorial notice of Dr. R. H. Charles in the *Proceedings of the British Academy* which will interest readers of the *Modern Churchman.* Appropriately it is written by Professor Burkitt. Anglican clergy who are Fellows of the British Academy are not numerous : as is to be expected, practically all are Modernists. Needless to say, their influence is out of all proportion to their number. Charles, with his massive learning, quick sympathies and engaging kindliness, was my neighbour for some five years when I was at Westminster Abbey. What impressed all his friends was his honesty, and it was this quality which gave power to his Abbey sermons. Dr. Burkitt in his *Memoir* includes an excerpt from a letter of Dr. Box which hardly, I think, gives an adequate picture of Charles as a preacher. It is true that some of the sermons were 'thoughtful, scholarly and elaborate.' But the dominant quality of his preaching was its practical character. Charles had always in mind the needs and difficulties of those who compose an average congregation. He deliberately chose subjects like gambling and marriage for courses of sermons which were heard with eager attention. I myself like listening to sermons; but, even had I no such taste, I think that I should have found those of Charles alike arresting and helpful. To the end large congregations of thoughtful men and women, many of them young, assembled to hear him, and they felt his passing to be a grave loss. Many of us who preach regularly might learn from him. It is not sufficient that we should fill our sermons with sound learning and good science. We need also to show the humanity that was so characteristic of Charles. We must appeal, in fact, not only to the head but also to the heart. All know that social enthusiasm and an understanding of the difficulties of personal religion can be used to cloak the deficiencies of a traditional theology that has become impossible. Modernists ought to use such enthusiasm and sympathy to make their faith a great religious force in the community.

E. W. BIRMINGHAM.

Bishop's Croft, Birmingham, 17.
January 13th, 1933.

'FOR THOSE AT SEA.'

SIR,

In a recent article in the *Modern Churchman* one of your contributors deals with the waning influence of the Church on land. I wish to make a brief statement about the waning influence of the Church in the Royal Navy. An ounce of fact is worth a ton of theory.

With the purpose of opening the eyes of the Church authorities on land, in the hope that they may find some means of checking the slump, I propose to draw attention to the following facts :

In the Royal Navy the average attendance at the voluntary service of Holy Communion is, on a high estimate, five in a thousand, officers and men. I have never known a rating to come to a service of Holy Communion in Barracks, out of a complement of over four thousand men.

There are several reasons for this state of affairs. To begin with, the Anglo-Catholics are very strongly represented among Naval Chaplains. The sacrament is reserved on board a battleship in the Home Fleet. Barracks

chapels are fitted with gongs and bells, and the Chaplains wear elaborate vestments. All this means nothing to the sailor, and is often openly ridiculed by the officers. They have no use for it. Their religion is genuine, sound, simple, almost Mosaic. They believe in courage, honesty and decency, and their religion is that which encourages these ideals. They will never be persuaded (and why should they?) that the cause of religion is advanced by the ringing of bells and the wearing of vestments. At a Parade Service I have actually heard a well-meaning Chaplain preach for twenty minutes on the Immaculate Conception. The comments I heard afterwards were both blasphemous and merited.

The standard of intelligence on the lower deck is higher than it has ever been before. New entries are signed on between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two. Owing to the general trade depression, many of them are secondary school boys who have been driven into the Navy by economic pressure. Those who enter from Naval training establishments possess a high level of educational attainment, with a good grounding in science. To all these, traditionalist Christianity is something that does not square with their experience. It is simply, as they see it, a system expounding theories long obsolete. It appears to them as a vast accretion of irrelevant dogmas.

Very many of these men have been completely out of touch with the Church. Their homes are unvisited by the parish clergy. They use the Church for marriage and burial purposes, knowing no other way, but a growing number are unbaptised. Even that tabu is breaking down.

Religion, if it is to be of any use in the Navy, must be simple and sincere. If only we at sea could have some scheme like that in South India! No ordinary sailor comprehends the difference between a Chaplain of the Church of England and a Weslyean or Baptist Chaplain. They are all 'padres.' Various foolish incidents have done a great deal of harm in late years; Anglo-Catholic Chaplains have made protests against a Captain's getting a Nonconformist Chaplain to take a Parade Service; and one Anglo-Catholic refused (though he was over-ruled by the Naval authorities) to allow 'his' chapel (an unconsecrated building used for Church of England services) to serve for what he described as 'sectarian purposes.' The sailor merely shrugs his shoulders, and says: 'If that's Christianity, then give me something else.' On the other hand, the cultivation of cordial relations with Free Church Chaplains can do much to help the cause of religion in the Navy. In one battleship which carried both a Church of England Chaplain and a Free Church Chaplain it was their custom to conduct their evening service together, and even in port seventy to a hundred men attended.

A sailor can understand God as his Father; he knows that he has duties and obligations to his neighbour, and is willing to carry them out. But ecclesiastical dogmas and ritualism do not seem to him to have any contact with the reality preached by Our Lord, nor do they seem to help him in any way to carry out his obligations as a child of God. The Navy is greatly in need of simple and sincere Christian teaching. Like the Church on land, it needs a prayer book which should contain a number of understandable, practical, modern services, and there is no reason why these should not be terse, dignified and inspiring.

'FROM THE BLUE.'

January, 1933.

A REVISED CATECHISM.

SIR,

It is delightful to see, in the December number of the *Modern Churchman*, that the Birmingham Modern Churchmen have purged the Catechism of so many things that darkened my understanding as a child; but surely

something simpler is required instead of 'they promise them both by their sureties, which promise when they come to age themselves are bound to perform.' I learnt the words parrot-like; even now I do not know when a child 'comes to age,' or how he 'performs' Repentance and Faith when the tender years end. Do the infants or the sureties really promise? No child could understand the allusion to sureties being bound over. Should not plain English be substituted for such jargon? Again, why should the word 'Ghost,' with its troublous suggestion for the child-mind, be retained? It might at any rate be changed to 'spirit' in the new answer about Baptism as is done in that about the Creed.

But a Church that lives and grows should not be dependent on private effort for the revision of its authorised forms and, may one add? its Bible translations to-day. One feels that these things should not be done in a hurry. Perhaps the Archbishops might appoint small standing committees charged with the duties of making draft revisions of Prayer Book and Version. Scholars expert in English are required for these tasks as well as theologians. Had the Revised Version been expressed in good English, throughout, it might have been accepted as greatly superior to the Authorised. Such standing committees might report to the Archbishops at set intervals of so many years, and would be accessible to the suggestions of students at home and abroad.

May I add that there should be some such committee for the making of addenda to the Apocrypha from works in prose or poetry which after many years still seem so inspired that the Church should read them 'for example of life and instruction of manners.' The Church should grow and her raiment be as the time and her needs require; but her present garment, long outgrown, brings her into contempt.

C. B. RUSSELL.

Stubbers, North Ockendon, Essex.
January 11th, 1933.

THE MODERN CHURCHMEN'S UNION COUNCIL ELECTION, 1933.

SIR,

I shall be obliged if you will kindly give publicity to the following official notice to members of the Modern Churchmen's Union.

By the Constitution the following elected members of the Council retire on the day of the Annual General Meeting (May 31st, 1933), and are *not eligible for re-election, viz.,* the Rev. Harry Bailey, the Rev. Canon J. S. Bezzant, the Hon. Gilbert Coleridge, Mr. Arthur Davies, Mr. Arthur Floyd, the Rev. W. W. Longford, the Rev. A. F. Robson, the Ven. Archdeacon V. F. Storr.

The following co-opted members of the Council retire on May 31st, but *are eligible for re-election, viz.,* the Rev. G. F. Allen, the Rev. L. Elliott Binns, the Rev. F. G. Given-Wilson, the Rev. H. D. A. Major, the Rev. Canon C. E. Raven, the Rev. H. J. Trueman, Mr. H. F. Walker, Mr. J. Wheeler Williams.

Ten members of the Council are to be elected this year, and the nominations of candidates must reach the Secretary not later than April 1st. The names must be proposed and seconded by members of the Union. If more than ten nominations are received, voting papers will be sent to all members of the Union.

T. J. WOOD.

The Church House, Westminster,
London, S.W.1.
February 2nd, 1933.